THEOLOGY

VOL. XLIV JUNE, 1942 No. 264

Analogy, Aquinas and Bishop Berkeley

BISHOP BERKELEY'S life has not been wanting in biographers, and no attempt is here made to add to our records of the philosopher. This essay draws attention to one particular episode, which biographers have overlooked. It provides an illuminating example of anglican apologetics and is not without significance for the present day.

I

In order to appreciate the fierce theological controversy in which Berkeley was born, grew up and played a prominent part, it is necessary to recall certain events in Ireland during the closing decades of the seventeenth century. George Berkeley was born in the county of Kilkenny on March 12, 1685. In 1697 Dublin was aroused by the public appearance of another Irishman, John Toland. This gentleman was a man of views, and his publication of *Christianity not Mysterious* had set on foot a violent discussion which crossed to England and lasted half a century. He was one of the first members of the new sect of Free-thinkers, and the theme of his book permitted no qualifications in his creed. His theme is now sufficiently well known. Claiming to base his argument on Locke (who was anxious to disown him), he maintained that reason is the only foundation of certainty, that there is no other ground for holding any belief, and that if we persist in talking about religion we must be careful to bear in mind that "it is entirely built upon ratiocination."[1]

Toland's was not a lone voice. He had taken hints from Chillingworth and Tillotson as well as from Locke, and some of his points were taken up by Tindal in *Christianity as Old as the Creation* and by Woolston in *Six Discourses*. But he had to pay the penalty for his views. His book appeared

[1] *Christianity not Mysterious*, p. 127.

anonymously in 1696. In the spring of 1697 he came in person to Ireland and divulged his identity. He rapidly became a centre of debate even outside academic circles: " a sermon against his errors was as much expected as if it had been prescribed in the rubric; and an Irish peer gave it as a reason why he ceased to attend church that once he heard there something about his saviour Jesus Christ, but now all the discourse was about one John Toland."[1] The affair came to a head when the Irish Parliament ordered the offending book to be burned and the author arrested.[2]

Toland escaped with his life. But his ideas remained, and were immediately attacked in *A Letter in Answer to a Book entitled Christianity not Mysterious*, by Dr Peter Browne, who in 1697 was Provost of Trinity College, Dublin. This reply was enlarged later, and it is with the development of the reply that we are here concerned.

The first stage of the development is marked by the appearance in 1709 of a *Sermon on the Consistency of Predestination and Foreknowledge with the Freedom of Man's Will*, by Dr William King, Archbishop of Dublin. This was a kind book in which the archbishop attempted to pour oil on the troubled waters. He insisted that in matters of religion our rational powers are necessarily limited. We can think and speak only as men, and any ideas we have of God must in fact be as different from reality as a map is from actual land and sea. Our one means to theological knowledge is therefore " metaphor." A second stage in the development of Browne's reply opened in 1728 when Browne himself offered an explanation of his views. He had by now become Bishop of Cork and Ross, and addressed himself to the question with an increased sense of responsibility and at greater length. *The Procedure, Extents and Limits of the Human Understanding*, published in 1728, was followed in 1733 by *Things Divine and Supernatural conceived by Analogy with Things Natural and Human.* Bishop Browne's aim now was to substitute " analogy " for Archbishop King's " metaphor." He urged that the term " metaphor " merely indicates some imaginary parallel between the divine and the human, while " analogy " implies that there is some resemblance which is real. But he did not leave this correction unqualified. In the end, he admitted, " we

[1] Hunt, *Religious Thought in England*, ii, 244.

[2] The tale is told with gusto by G. A. Johnston, *The Development of Berkeley's Philosophy* (1923), p. 15.

have no direct or proper notions or conceptions of God and His attributes." Of God we have " no more notion than a blind man hath of light."

Browne therefore did not add much to the debate. He was obviously dissatisfied with King's eirenicon, but his own exposition did not promise much more. Toland's offensive had embarrassed the Irish episcopate, for both divines made a strategic withdrawal into a non-rational religion where reason is not permitted to formulate any certain doctrine of God.

Berkeley was to reach manhood while the discussion was in progress, and from early days came directly under its influence. In March, 1700, at the age of fifteen, he went up to Trinity College during the provostship of Peter Browne. He published his *Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* and was ordained deacon in 1709, the year of King's sermon. The following year finds him entering the contemporary controversy. He considered that there was a weakness common to the utterances of both bishops, and that by reason of this they were not really answering Toland. He bravely inserted his own apologetic into the discussion, supporting the faith of the bishops by denying their views.

Berkeley began with a criticism of the Archbishop of Dublin in 1710. This he kept private. In a personal letter to his friend, Sir John Percival,[1] dated Trinity College, March 1, he remarks:

> I met with some who, supporting themselves on the authority of the Archbishop of Dublin's sermon concerning the prescience of God, denied there was any more wisdom, goodness or understanding in God than there were feet or hands, but that all are to be taken in a figurative sense; whereupon I consulted the sermon, and to my surprise found his Grace asserting that strange doctrine. 'Tis true he holds there is something in the divine nature analogous or equivalent to those attributes. But upon such principles I must confess that I do not see how it is possible to demonstrate the existence of God: there being no argument that I know of for His existence, which does not prove Him at the same time to be an understanding, wise and benevolent Being, in the strict, literal and proper meaning of those words.[2]

---

[1] He became Lord Percival in 1715 and was created first Earl of Egmont in 1733.

[2] Benjamin Rand, *Berkeley and Percival* (1914), p. 73.

In this letter Berkeley proceeds to tell of

a treatise I have now in the press, the design of which is to demonstrate the existence and attributes of God, the immortality of the soul, the reconciliation of God's foreknowledge with freedom of men, and by showing the emptiness or falseness of several parts of the speculative sciences, to reduce men to the study of religion and things useful.

The work which this ambitious aim inspired was published in the summer of 1710 as the " first part " of a *Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*. It was never completed. But the letter in which Berkeley outlines his purpose and his dissatisfaction with King's doctrine of metaphor shows which way his mind was travelling. He saw that his vital task was to fill in the gaps of the archbishop's argument. If we can speak of God only in terms of metaphor, we cannot ultimately speak of Him with certainty at all. And if we cannot so speak of Him, how can we worship, serve, believe in Him ? George Berkeley was taking his duty as a Christian minister seriously. He intended to make his philosophic speculations " subservient to the ends of morality and religion."

In the meantime came Browne's criticism of King. The appearance of the *Procedure* in 1728 could not have surprised Berkeley. As early as 1711 he had hinted to Percival in another connexion that " the paper war is likely to prove violent and of long continuance,"[1] and there was no reason for thinking that this controversy would be an exception. But when the book did appear, it disappointed him. The lull in argument had given him time to see the implications of the position which he had outlined in his letter to Percival. He therefore set to work to criticize Browne. His contention was that Browne, although substituting " analogy " for " metaphor," did not understand what " analogy " meant. Interpretation of the term " analogy " thus becomes the core of the controversy. Berkeley seeks both to correct the theists and to provide an effective reply to the deists by producing a legitimate and satisfactory account of what " analogy " is. This is the significance[2] of Berkeley's part in the controversy.

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 95.

[2] Leslie Stephen and subsequent students, who accept his interpretation of the period, do not see this significance, because he misrepresents Berkeley's criticism of Browne as based on the view that " all Browne's ingenious contortions were as much thrown away as the contortions of

II

The passage in which Berkeley hopes to settle the dispute occurs in *Alciphron ; or, the Minute Philosopher.* This work was first published in 1732. Browne's second book, the *Divine Analogy,* appeared in the following year with the purpose of following up the discussion, but Berkeley wrote to his American friend, Johnson, " I have taken no public notice " of it, and clearly intended his readers to consider that the *Alciphron* contained his final word on the subject. The relevant sections are numbers 17-22 in the Fourth Dialogue. Berkeley begins with the claim that a deist position is tantamount to " atheism "; for if

> the belief that there is an unknown subject of attributes absolutely unknown . . . could once make its way and obtain in the world, there would be an end of all natural or rational religion, which is the basis both of the Jewish and Christian.

There follows a remarkable review of doctrines held by " the Fathers or Schoolmen," at the conclusion of which comes Berkeley's main contention. With the sentence—" Thomas Aquinas expresseth his sense of this point in the following manner "—he embarks on an exposition of the thomist doctrine of analogy, using the commentaries on Aquinas by Cajetan and Suarez. His purpose is to show that Browne has misunderstood the thomist doctrine, and by reference to the thomist tradition to correct him accordingly. The entire theological controversy has here crystallized into a difference on a point of thomist exegesis.

Berkeley has an advantage in the discussion, for he appears to be writing with a copy of Cajetan's *De Nominum Analogia* beside him. He is thus able to give a careful statement of " the scholastic use " (that is to say, Cajetan's use) " of the terms *analogy* and *analogical.*" Berkeley sees that by analogy Browne was referring to what the medieval schoolmen, following Thomas Aquinas, called " analogy of proportionality " or of relation. This type of analogy is built on the plan of a mathematical proportion or equation. But Browne had not noticed a distinction between two forms

---

abler men. . . . From the premiss that we do not and cannot form any conceptions of God, the commonplace and the acute thinker will alike draw the inference that theology lies beyond the limits within which the human intellect can work effectively " (Leslie Stephen, *English Thought in the Eighteenth Century,* (1881), i. 86). But this premiss is the property of Stephen rather than of Berkeley.

of this one type of analogy—" metaphorical and proper." Cajetan had remarked that the Bible includes many instances of the former. Berkeley agrees with this and illustrates it by noting how, when we say that we see the finger of God in some piece of history, all we mean is that the event can be ascribed to God as the works of human fingers are ascribed to men. But this " metaphorical " analogy, which Browne had been expounding, is to be distinguished from " proper " analogy. Berkeley underlines the distinction in a key paragraph:

> The case is different when wisdom and knowledge are attributed to God. Passions and senses, as such, imply defect; but in knowledge simply, or as such, there is no defect. Knowledge, therefore, in the proper formal meaning of the word, may be attributed to God *proportionately*—that is, preserving a proportion to the infinite nature of God.

Professor Fraser, in his edition of Berkeley's works, rightly drew attention to the importance of this last phrase; but he confessed that he could not see the point of it: " What does this seemingly important qualification imply?"[1] It is evident that the clue lies in the thomist doctrine which Berkeley is advancing. The sentence refers to " the similitude of proportions " which he discusses in his preceding paragraph. This suggestion is confirmed by the illustrations, of which two are quoted from Cajetan and the third is added, presumably, by Berkeley. All three can be stated in a mathematical shape. Thus, the two quoted from Cajetan are:

$$(1) \qquad \frac{2}{6}=\frac{3}{9},$$

$$(2) \qquad \frac{\text{intellect}}{\text{mind}}=\frac{\text{sight}}{\text{body}}.$$

The additional illustration is:

$$\frac{\text{prince}}{\text{state}}=\frac{\text{pilot}}{\text{vessel}}.$$

The implication of the phrase which Fraser could not understand is, therefore, the theory that an equation can be constructed on this plan to denote the predication of attributes to God. Thus:

$$\frac{\text{human knowledge}}{\text{man}}=\frac{\text{divine knowledge}}{\text{God}}.$$

[1] A. C. Fraser, *Berkeley's Complete Works* (1901), ii, 187.

Or, human knowledge is to man as divine knowledge is to God. Berkeley recognizes the scope of this conclusion in the close to his key paragraph:

We may say, therefore, that as God is infinitely above man, so is the knowledge of God infinitely above the knowledge of man, and this is what Cajetan calls *analogia propria facta*. And after this same analogy we must understand all those attributes to belong to the Deity which in themselves simply, and as such, denote perfections. We may, therefore, consistently with what hath been premised, affirm that all sorts of perfections which we can conceive in a finite spirit are in God, but without any of that alloy which is found in creatures. This doctrine, therefore, of analogical perfections in God, or our knowing God by analogy, seems very much misunderstood and misapplied by those who would infer from thence that we cannot frame any direct or proper notion, though never so inadequate, of knowledge or wisdom, as they are in the Deity; or understand any more of them than one born blind can of light and colours.[1]

This passage is a landmark in the history of anglican apologetics. It is a direct appeal, under the stress of acute controversy, to medieval thomist tradition. Here was the one " doctrine " which Berkeley could find with which he might both parry the thrusts of contemporary agnosticism and correct the views of those anglicans who had endeavoured to meet the attacks without much success. At the time it seemed to him indispensable; without it " every syllogism brought to prove those attributes, or, which is the same thing, to prove the being of God, will be found to consist of four terms, and consequently can conclude nothing."[2]

III

Berkeley's acceptance of analogy was, however, marred by an unfortunate inconsistency. The doctrine came into his hands at a convenient moment,[3] and he saw the possi-

[1] *Alciphron*, Dial. IV, sect. 21. The last sentence is a personal answer to Bishop Browne's conclusion, quoted above (p. 323), from *Things Divine and Supernatural.*

[2] *Ib.*, sect. 22. Other references to the theory of analogy in Berkeley are listed by Fraser. An exhaustive modern treatment of the theory in its classic form is contained in M. T. L. Penido, *Le rôle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique* (1931).

[3] It appears that Berkeley discovered the doctrine through investigating the teaching of Suarez (1528-1617) on the subject of ideas in the mind of God. This was immediately relevant to his own doctrine of " ideas." It is expounded by Suarez in *Disputationes Metaphysicæ*,

bility of using it as a weapon in the battle with unbelief. He was therefore unwilling to let it go. But by adopting the doctrine he was paying tribute to medieval schoolmen, and this was a reversal of his usual manner. " The Schoolmen," he notes,[1] " have noble subjects but handle them ill." In *Siris*[2] he does appeal to them for teaching on other points. But this is a late work[3] and raises problems of its own. If Berkeley had thought out the implications of his adoption of analogy in *Alciphron*, he would have seen fit to revise his own estimate of medieval theologians.

Again, a thorough acceptance of the thomist doctrine would not be satisfied with Berkeley's " idealism." The doctrine of analogy represents a special technique in theological knowledge. Its claim is that it enables the believer to employ with certain reference to God words which are customarily employed of man and nature, that this use of the words indicates certainty in our knowledge about God, and that it points to a middle road between agnosticism and anthropomorphism. Berkeley, however, shortens the road by considering only " ideas " within the mind. His own principles preclude him from beginning at the thomist starting-point, which is the graded variety of the " external world." Consequently, although he escapes from an open contradiction of Aquinas on this question, he conditions severely the conclusion of the argument which he means to accept. There is a tension in his theological thinking of which perhaps he is hardly aware. But this is not an isolated instance of his proneness to quote without really knowing his authorities. This habit finds final expression in the philosophical passages of *Siris*. He is now writing in his sixtieth year. He draws extensively and uncritically upon the reading of a lifetime, and assembles an array of

XXX, sect. 15, where there is a reference to the *Summa Theologica* of Thomas Aquinas. Berkeley discusses this alongside of Suarez in *Alciphron*. It would be but a natural sequel for him to turn to Cajetan, a standard commentator on Aquinas. He would thus arrive at his statement of the doctrine of analogy, which amounts to a paraphrase of Cajetan, *de Nominum Analogia*, chap. iii, 23-26. Cajetan (1469-1534) believed that his theory (which was neater than previous discussions on the subject) was no novelty, but a revival of the views of Aquinas (see Penido, p. 143, note 2). Berkeley reproduces it as a direct descendant from the Angelic Doctor.

[1] *Commonplace Book*.

[2] For example, he quotes with approval the technical terms, *punctum stans* (351), and *eminenter* (352).

[3] Published in 1744.

references which not only require to be harmonized but on occasion appear to cancel each other. Fraser admits that not every quotation has been " digested," and that the book can be commended only if eclecticism in theology is a thing to be desired.[1] The German translators significantly published only those parts of the treatise which relate to non-theological matters. It was in the context of this muddled thought that Berkeley's appeal to Aquinas did not carry much weight. But in this it was Berkeley who failed, not Aquinas; his quotations were sufficient to show that he recognized his own need of authorities.

W. W. S. March.

Reader's Guide to Barth's Dogmatics

Barth's *Church Dogmatics* is not a manifesto but a textbook. He discusses these two kinds of theological writing in the course of the work itself. (*The Doctrine of the Word of God*, pp. 316-21. One of his most lucid passages, this might well be read first by a person seriously intending to master the book.) Both, he maintains, are necessary for theological progress, and they shouldn't be played off against one another. The temptation of our age is to exalt the manifesto and undervalue the textbook; yet we accuse Barth, who has tackled the writing of a textbook, as most of his critics have not, of being anti-rational, " volcanic," " prophetic," and the good Lord knows what else.

In a textbook, order and arrangement and structure are important; and it is this aspect of Barth's textbook that I want chiefly to exhibit here. He himself devotes much attention to it, and at several points stops to explain just how he has proceeded so far and how he intends to proceed next (*op. cit.*, pp. 213, 284-6, 330-5). A theological textbook, like a service of public worship, is a work of art, in which the artist has certain limited materials at his disposal, certain limited ways of using them, and within those limits a certain freedom, his art consisting in using this freedom well. We should learn to appreciate a theologian's placing

[1] A. C. Fraser, *op. cit.*, iii, 278, note 3: " Sections 320-329, in accumulating authorities . . . suggest . . . the elasticity of our theistic conception, adapted to theological eclecticism, and to tolerance of diversity in theological expression."

of the doctrine of the Trinity in his system as we do a liturgist's placing of the " Epiclesis " in a Communion Service or an architect's placing of an arch on a building.

The Work as a Whole

The Dogmatics, when completed, will have five volumes. The first is the Prolegomena or Introduction to the rest; the second handles " The Doctrine of God "; the third, God's work of Creation; the fourth, His work of Reconciliation; the fifth, the completing and making effectual of His work of Reconciliation by His work of Redemption. The plan is not unlike that of Calvin's Institutes and many other theological systems, and is broadly based on the Apostles' Creed, Barth's lectures on the Creed, his *Credo*, being in effect a summary of the larger work. (What amounts to a shorter summary of it, an outline of his " program," may be found in an early lecture on " The Doctrinal Task of the Reformed Churches " in the collection *The Word of God and the Word of Man.*)

Some theologians have divided their systems into a half on the Christian faith and half on the Christian life. Thus the Presbyterian Shorter Catechism handles in succession " what man is to believe concerning God " and " what duty God requires of man." This is Barth's course in his Gifford Lectures on *The Knowledge of God and the Service of God.* Here, however, he treats " the service of God " or ethics in a kind of postcript to each of his volumes on " the knowledge of God," the service we owe to God as our Creator, for example, being discussed at the end of vol. iii.

Of these five volumes Barth has so far completed one and a half. The first half of vol. i runs to 560 closely printed pages, the second to about 1,000, and the first half of vol. ii to about 800. Only the first of these half-volumes has so far been translated, under the title of *The Doctrine of the Word of God.* All page-references in this article are to this translation.

The Introduction

The first volume opens with two short sections, on the task of Dogmatics and the task of Prolegomena to Dogmatics respectively. In the second of these he maintains that an " introduction " to theology must itself be a piece of theology —there is no way of laying a basis for theology in philosophy,

for example; or at all events the theologian must not depend on such a basis being provided for him (this more moderate statement of his position is contained in a note on pp. 41-3, on an article by his philosopher brother Heinrich). Theology must stand on its own feet. This is the section in which he prosecutes his famous controversy with Brunner about the possibility of a " Natural Theology " or Apologetics.

Then come the four long chapters of the Prolegomena or Introduction itself, in which the true " theological basis " of theology is laid down and made clear. The basis of Barth's theology is the Word of God, so the title of the first of these four chapters is " The Word of God as the Criterion of Dogmatics." In an early section in this chapter he explains that the Word of God comes to man in three forms —God's original revelation of Himself in Christ, the record of it in Holy Scripture, and the proclamation of it by the Church in all ages. These are the successive subjects of the remaining three chapters.

Scripture and preaching, Barth holds, are not in themselves the Word of God, nor do they " contain " it; but by the work of His Spirit they may " become " His Word—they may become the speech of the living Christ to us here and now. That, at all events, is where Christ has taught us to expect to hear Him in this time of waiting and remembering before we meet Him face to face. And it is by the witness of Scripture that the witness of the Church is to be tested and criticized, such criticism being the essential task of theology.

Barth regards this introductory volume as the modern counterpart of the chapter on Holy Scripture, the " Rule of Faith," with which textbooks and Confessions of Faith were introduced in an earlier day (see, *e.g.*, Chapter I of the Westminster Confession). But, in accordance with what has been said above, the introduction is not a philosophical proof of the reliability of the Bible, or a philosophical explanation of how the Bible is to be used and understood. Barth holds that we must let the Bible itself tell us what its authority is, and how it is to be used. But the Bible does not speak primarily about itself, but about God and Jesus Christ whom He has sent; and that is the order in which Barth proceeds in laying his foundations (p. 339).

By far the longest chapter in the Prolegomena is the

second, on the original revelation of God in Christ. It is divided into three " parts," the first on the Trinity, the second on the Incarnation, and the third on the Holy Spirit. These subjects, especially the latter two, will naturally be dealt with in still greater detail in later volumes. Their introduction at this point is in accordance with Barth's view that the foundations of theology must themselves be theological. To explain what " revelation " means he does not set out what faculties man has and how he uses them to detect a divine revelation; he sets out (from the revelation itself) who God is and how He makes Himself known. Barth has not only attacked " natural theology " and " apologetics "; what is much more important, he has written a positive " introduction to theology " that is complete without them.

This early introduction of such a subject as Christology illustrates another feature of Barth's theological architecture. He often raises some subject, deals with it as completely as is necessary for the task in hand, and then passes on to the large number of other matters which we need to grasp before being able to understand it properly, and then returns to it again. Thus he discusses the task of Dogmatics in his opening few sections until it is plain that we can get no further with it until we have a better grasp of what he means by " the Word of God." He accordingly discusses the Word of God in the next several sections, and then returns to the subject of " the task of Dogmatics " in Section 7. Again, further knowledge of other matters is evidently required, and he does not finish what he has to say about the task of Dogmatics until the end of the second half-volume.

One advantage of this method for the English-speaking reader is that he will find Barth's views on a variety of subjects already formulated in a preliminary way, but still fairly completely, in the one half-volume already translated. His views on predestination and free will, for example, are sketched on pp. 226-9, although they are not due for detailed elaboration until the (yet unpublished) second half of vol. ii.

The Logic of the Word of God

Though he deals first with the question, Who is God ? (the Holy Trinity), and then with the question, How does He make Himself known ? (the Incarnation and the Spirit's

awakening of us to its truth and reality), Barth insists that it is only through God's making Himself known to us—only through His entering into definite relations with us—that we know who He is in Himself, and he arranges his subordinate sections accordingly. Again and again we have a section or sub-section about God as He is in relation to us, and only *after* that the corresponding section about God as He is in Himself. In dealing with the Trinity, for example, he first speaks of God as our Creator, then as the Eternal Father; first as our Reconciler, then as the Eternal Son; first as our Redeemer, then as the Eternal Spirit.

Again and again, on the other hand, Barth insists that this step from God in relation to us to God as He is in Himself *is* a step that we can and must take. In His relations with us God is true to Himself; He reveals Himself as He really is; and so we must express our faith in, for example, the *eternal* and *absolute* divinity of Christ if we are to believe both that Christ is God to us and that God is not a deceiver (pp. 481 *ff*). Moreover, if the Holy Spirit appears in relation to us as the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, then He is in Himself and in eternity the Spirit of the Father and the Son, and not of the Father only (pp. 548*f*.). Barth thus does not consider it being wise above what is written to take sides on this subtle question which divided the Eastern and the Western Churches. This is typical of the detail into which he considers it possible to go on such a subject as the Trinity without entering the sphere of illegitimate speculation.

Rigid limits, however, are set to the possibilities of making inferences in theology by the fact that it has to be formulated in the language, and enter into and proceed from the thought, of sinful men—language and thought which is in itself quite unfitted to contain and convey the revelation of God. Only God's grace, taking up our words and thoughts into its own purposes, can really make them serve those purposes; and what God in His freedom takes up He can as easily lay down again. This dependence on God's free grace must be reflected in the theologian's movement of thought. He can and must use all sorts of analogies, but cannot press them further than the Bible warrants. All of them, if held on to too firmly, as if they had any worth in themselves, will lead to contradictions of the truth which the theologian is trying to express with them, and as soon as this happens he must drop them. We may, for example,

describe the Father as that Person of the Trinity who achieves our creation, the Son as He who achieves our reconciliation, and the Spirit as He who achieves our redemption; but we must not press this " appropriation " so far as to deny that the Son and the Spirit are also at work in creation, the Father and the Spirit in reconciliation, and so on (pp. 428 *f.*, 452 *f.*, 507, 542).

These basic principles to be observed by the theologian in his use of words and concepts are especially clearly set out in the course of a criticism of the old doctrine of the " Vestigium Trinitatis," which attempted to make the doctrine of the Trinity intelligible by means of quite precise analogies in the created world—the three faculties of the human mind, etc. (pp. 389 *ff.*). They are further illustrated in Barth's discussion of the use of the term " Person " in Trinitarian dogma (pp. 421 *ff.*), and of the description of the Second Person as the Son and as the Word (pp. 494-501).

In the doctrine of the Trinity, of course, the inadequacy of all human language is obvious, but Barth does not, like many theologians, treat this doctrine as a specially awkward patch of Christian divinity, attended with difficulties which do not confront us in other parts of the subject. For him, it is *the* typical Christian doctrine, and all other doctrines have to be handled in just the same delicate and difficult way. On all the main problems of theology there are quite definite affirmations to be made, but also quite definite points at which we are brought up against the unsuitability of all our human terms and concepts for making such affirmations.

It is in this spirit that Barth approaches, for example, the problems associated with God's providential government of this world in which, despite that government, His will is so flagrantly violated (see pp. 35-38 of his *Credo* for a summary of his views here).

Relevant and Irrelevant Questions

Another repeated movement of Barth's thought that is worth noting is a habit of first considering and dismissing the irrelevant questions which some subject seems to raise, and then setting out the real point at issue.

Right in the first section, for example, he affirms that theology has a right to call itself a " science." This does not mean, however, that he has accepted some current

formulation of the rules of scientific thinking and decided to abide by them in his theology. Nor does it mean that he is prepared to enter into an argument as to whether these rules are the right ones, and try to formulate better ones. He means simply to affirm that theology is an orderly human effort after truth, and also to affirm in an indirect way that it is not such a " heathen " thing to be a scientist, a seeker after truth, as both scientists and their enemies sometimes say it is (pp. 6-11).

Again, in discussing what sort of theology is " scientific " and what is not, he warns us against thinking that only textbook theology is " scientific " while " manifesto theology " is not, or *vice versa*. Theology is scientific if it is faithful to its standard, the Word of God in Scripture, and to its aim, the production of better preaching (pp. 321-30).

Similarly, in discussing the nature of our knowledge of God, he refuses to affirm that some particular aspects of our personality (mind, feeling, conscience) are more open to divine influences than others, or that any are less open to them, and proceeds to a positive description of the " acknowledgment " of divine revelation that is faith (pp. 230-7).

A. N. Prior.

Romano Guardini

One of the outstanding figures of German Catholicism today is doubtless Romano Guardini. By word and example, lectures and publications, he has made a lasting contribution to the shaping of a truly Catholic Germany. As leader of the Youth Organization Quickborn and as professor of Catholic philosophy at the University of Berlin his influence was profound as well as far-reaching. His lectures on Dante, Nietzsche, and Dostoievski in pre-Nazi years were attended by Protestant as well as Catholic students, and even those who were Christians only in name have drawn inspiration from his critical and didactic studies.

In a truly unique manner Guardini unites deep philosophical insight with profound theology, the sensitiveness of the poet with the scholar's accuracy, the qualities of a teacher with those of a priest. Yet with all his rich gifts of intellect and emotion, his keen appreciation of beauty, and burning love of the world, he has not yielded to the

modern temptation of emancipating himself from God, but remains a simple believer. Such a man cannot fail to impress an age that seeks in a vague, highly emotional philosophy the solution of its problems, a solution lost when it lost its faith.

Perhaps more deeply than any other contemporary thinker, Guardini has realized the issues at stake today. Since the end of the last war he has known that the great question is, whether Christianity will be the decisive element in the shaping of the future of civilization, or the neo-paganism whose power has today become manifest even to the blindest of eyes. Like other Catholic thinkers, he is convinced that the age of humanism has run its course, that its original impetus has died down, and that the present age is suffering from the results of a movement which, by breaking up the medieval unity of the Church, could not fail to lead to paganism. The task before us, as Guardini sees it, is to arrive at an attitude which, while retaining the fruits of the bygone age, such as the appreciation of the value and dignity of personality, will yet give full expression to those medieval elements of unity and order which are so sadly lacking in our present civilization. For such an attitude alone can combat the disruptive tendencies of our day. Unless a Christian form can be found which will embrace all the tendencies of this era—its desire for community, its anti-intellectualism, and its craving for a new orthodoxy—the world will be shaped by anti-Christian, anti-human forces.

Long before the struggle between Christianity and paganism, which is now in full progress, became manifest Guardini realized the danger. With stern determination he accepted the challenge of paganism and proceeded to attack the enemy with all the power at his disposal. This attack is, however, carried on on the highest level. For what Guardini fights is not any individual or movement, but the perversion of thought itself that has led man away from God. It is therefore in the realm of thought that he meets the enemy, following him into his very stronghold, there to beat him with the weapons forged by centuries of Catholic tradition.

For this task Guardini is admirably equipped. He was born in 1885 in Italy, the son of a merchant. But his parents soon moved to Mayence, where he received a German education, and was ordained priest in 1910. How

deeply this young Italian was influenced by the spirit of Germany can be gathered from the fact that after Italy had declared war on Germany in 1915, he chose to stay in Mayence, though his family returned to their native country. In 1920 he became lecturer at the University of Bonn, from where he was called to the chair of Catholic philosophy at the University of Berlin. Here his influence was extraordinary, for he possesses that rare combination of Italian lucidity and German depth which enables him to express the profoundest truths in the simplest of words. He was therefore almost predestined to fight the battle for a Catholic Europe in the very country which is of decisive importance: Germany.

All Guardini's activities can be regarded as expressions of a struggle for the Faith. Yet he is not a fighter in the ordinary sense of the word. The polemic element in his writings is indeed slight. He does not need to be polemic, for he possesses the gift of creative interpretation which helps him to penetrate to the very core of a problem and present it, not from the sordidness of a worldly point of view, but *sub specie æternitatis*. His method of approach is almost invariably the same. At first he takes a more or less superficial view of his subjects, stating the how, and where, and when. Then he proceeds to lay bare layer after layer, till in the end he has pierced the trappings and reaches the very heart. Nor is he satisfied with a single line of approach. He attacks a problem from all possible angles, drawing nearer and nearer to its centre. This method lends his works a peculiar depth and luminousness. The surface of things no longer presents itself as a plane of two dimensions, but as the gateway to a three-dimensional world with foreground, middle distance, and a background which is infinite because it reaches to God Himself.

Yet Romano Guardini does more than open long vistas of experience and present an ordered and graded universe. This might still be a static universe, immobile like an edifice of stone, and as cold. Guardini's universe is not. It is a living thing, permeated by the spirit of a God who has called Himself the Living God. To bring men closer to this God, to open their eyes so that they might see and yearn for Him, has been Guardini's aim from the beginning of his career as a teacher and a priest.

His work as leader of the Catholic Youth Organization Quickborn brought him into touch with young and eager

minds from all parts of Germany and made him realize their urgent need for a reinterpretation of the Faith in terms which our age can understand. If the battle was pitched between Christianity and modern paganism, it was necessary that the issue should be stated in unmistakable terms. Guardini has devoted his whole life to this task. In works critical and constructive, as a poet, a teacher, and a priest, he has not ceased to develop his conception of a new Christian Europe. In this vision of the future the Church must necessarily figure in a prominent position. It is by no mere coincidence that the Church is the subject of Guardini's early works. In the early post-war years, when Germany resembled a cauldron of confused and often conflicting tendencies, in which the discerning eye could, however, already trace the dim outline of things to come, Guardini voices his firm belief in the readiness of the age for a renewed acceptance of the Church and her teaching. He rejoices in all the signs of a change of spirit, which, though partly obscured by the noisier prophets of the age, yet all point in one direction: the gradual appreciation of the existence of God—a belief that had been widely lost in Germany after more than a century of practically pagan teaching; the breaking down of the barriers separating one individual from another, which would enable him to unite with his fellows in common worship; the growing feeling that man is a thinking, willing, feeling whole, not a mere intellectual machine; and finally the realization that the claims of objective truth are more firmly established than the subjectivism of the past age would grant. All these urges, Guardini maintains, can and will find their fulfilment in the Church. More especially in his studies in the Liturgy he points out the possibilities of such a living with the Church. The Liturgy is to him no mere formalism; liturgical life is that true expression of Christianity which enables the whole of man, his thinking, feeling, and willing self, to learn the right attitude toward his Maker. The Liturgy teaches him the correct use of matter, the right gesture, and the adequate expression. The great prayers of the Church as well as the offices are a school to lead us to *sentire cum ecclesia.*

The task is indeed no easy one, for we have lost that attitude of devotion which the Middle Ages possessed to so high a degree. Our mind is small and our understanding limited. Maybe we prefer a popular devotion to the

sublime austerity of the Mass. We may feel chilled by the cool splendour of liturgical prayer. But if we endeavour to enter into the spirit of the Liturgy, if we suffer ourselves to be taught by the Church, our hearts will be kindled, our understanding quickened, and the true meaning of divine worship revealed. Then and only then can we realize what the possibilities of human life are and be enabled to present to the age an ideal as worthy of our efforts as it is attractive.

After having outlined the ideal, Guardini proceeds to show the practical steps involved in its realization. Above all, it necessitates a strict discipline and severe self-restraint. In his Letters on Self-education, addressed to members of his youth group, he teaches God's workmen the elements of their craft. Invariably beginning with everyday experiences, he helps them to master their difficulties and shape their lives by the power of faith. The questions are often very simple, such as hospitality and truthfulness, or the difficulty of growing up, but they are treated with the mastery of the born teacher and with reference to the highest Christian standards. "What are the spheres of a true man?" Guardini asks. He has many wise things to say about work done as an irksome duty or as a form of divine service, about true recreation and the spirit of fair play. Yet all this is only preparatory to the final realization that the cross stands at the end of everything and is the test of real manhood. He alone has attained to it who can stand alone and unflinching under the cross.

For adults Guardini's instructions are less detailed yet more far-reaching. Their primary task is to escape from the bondage into which that travesty of existence called modern life has cast them, to win back that serenity of spirit which is the fruit as well as the condition of a closer communion with God. Theirs is not so much a question of acting in a specific manner as of being or becoming what they were not before. For the very tension of modern life with its concentrated effort, its cult of speed and efficiency, prevents them from entering the courts of peace. It is only when the tension is relaxed and the noisy voices hushed that God can speak to the soul. Guardini shows how this can be done, how meditation can be taught, and ever fresh depths of the heart unlocked. It is again a relearning of the medieval attitude of devotion whose fruits are infinite as the Spirit of God Himself inspires them. From each

incident of our lives, however insignificant, there leads a way straight to God, the way of complete surrender to the divine Will. Whoever accepts all the experiences of his life as coming from the hands of his Father will find all his soul's needs fulfilled.

How is it, then, that the overwhelming majority have lost their way, that some are steadily drifting away from God, and that others are ranged on the side of anti-Christian forces? Mainly in two critical studies, on Pascal and Dostoievski, Guardini gives an answer to this question. Man no longer conceives the universe as resting in the hand of God, and all his doing and thinking as sheltered beneath the Divine wing. He lost this security when he entered upon his career of emancipation in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The expansion of the known world, the increase of human knowledge, the growing sense of autonomy, led him into serious religious difficulties. He began to doubt the omnipotence of the Creator in a universe whose dimensions had grown so vast, and in the exuberance of his newly-won freedom he discovered in the autonomous personality the source of all morals. Yet he was to go still further. After having replaced the living God by the absolutes of mathematico-logical necessity—a process which was completed in the course of the nineteenth century—he now questions the need for any absolute. God is dead, Friedrich Nietzsche wrote more than two generations ago, and the creed of the superman was established.

Yet the urge to worship something higher than himself, which is innate in man, cannot easily be ignored. So we are today faced by the spectacle of nations paying homage to diverse idols: the nation, the State, or even an individual. All these possibilities, which have become realities in our time, were foreshadowed in the novels of the great Russian, and we may well fear that the darkest of his prophecies may similarly come true. For it is one thing to declare that God is dead, yet set up other idols in His stead, and quite another to deny the existence of any higher power and consider man as the be-all and end-all. A phase of dire distress has to be passed through when man in his agony of isolation roams the fear-haunted void, which, since he denies the existence of God, is bereft of all meaning. And what if he perseveres and reaches the end of his course of emancipation? It is the cold immobility of Stavrogin in Dostoievski's *Demons*, who is unable to share the pleasure

and pain of human life, its failures and its victories, its passions and its seasons of calm tranquillity, because his soul is icebound as are the souls in Dante's nethermost hell.

We know today that these are not merely threatening spectres or vain conjectures. A great section of civilized mankind is pursuing a course that must inevitably lead to the destruction of the soul. To them as well as to us Romano Guardini utters his cry of warning and offers in terms intelligible to our age the old gospel of redemption.[1]

Irene Marinoff.

Ordinations Under the Commonwealth

In January, 1645, the Parliament issued the Directory for Worship, together with an ordinance for the taking away of the Book of Common Prayer and establishing the Directory in its place. The order to abolish the Prayer Book was evaded, and in August of the same year a more explicit ordinance was issued, forbidding the use of the Prayer Book "in any church, chapel or public place of worship, or in any private place or family within the Kingdom of England." No prohibition could have been more comprehensive. Those who possessed Prayer Books were wise to hide them away from authorized or voluntary searchers lest, having them, they should be suspected of using them. In some churches the familiar prayers might still be heard, for a few priests who had not been dispossessed were accustomed to recite the Prayer Book offices without book. George Bull, the future Bishop of St David's, did so in his country parish, and was once commended by a Puritan for being one that prayed by the Spirit, and had no need of the beggarly element and carnal performance of the printed book.

The bishops had been driven from their sees; it was boasted that episcopacy had been utterly put down. Bishop Hall of Norwich said that from 1641 onward it had been regarded as an open violation of the law for a bishop to ordain, nor could layfolk be confirmed. The question of maintaining the priesthood began to press. The losses had been many,

[1] The following books by Guardini have already been translated into English and are published by Sheed and Ward: *Conscience* (4s.), *Sacred Signs* (3s.), *The Spirit of the Liturgy* (3s.), *The Way of the Cross* (1s. 3d.).

some of the clergy had been evicted from their parishes with brutality, their stipends had been alienated to Puritan preachers, and the hardships which they suffered were responsible for many early deaths. Some priests were able to remain near their people, living on the charity of their neighbours, ministering to them secretly, as John Evelyn often records. But the priesthood could only be maintained—and that in insufficient numbers—by secret ordinations, and to that course bishops resorted, praying that the tyranny might soon be overpast and the Church be able to come out again into the open.

The whole question of ordinations under the Commonwealth awaits further research. But from the nature of the case it is difficult to find evidence. The watchfulness of the Puritans made it inadvisable to have more witnesses than was absolutely necessary; a bishop's foes might be those of his own household, reduced though episcopal households were. It was considered unsafe to give Letters of Orders to those ordained, for they might fall into hostile hands; it seems to have been the usual practice for the bishop to make an entry in his private register to serve for a record for the time being. There is evidence that some were given their Letters of Orders at the Restoration when the danger was past. George Bull and Symon Patrick, both of them bishops in after years, were among those who had received them then.

Of those bishops who ventured their liberty Robert Skinner is the best known. He had made his home at Launton, near Bicester, when he had been driven from the see of Oxford, and is said to have ordained there more than three hundred clergymen. It is probable that he ordained also in Oxford, where churchmen were numerous, and where resort to him would have been less noted by unfriendly eyes than in a small country village. He was reputed also to have ordained in all parts of the country; that would be difficult to verify.

Among those who received clandestine ordination were several who became bishops or deans. Of them we have certain knowledge, for the facts of their ordination became public property; of the very many who remained undistinguished we have scarcely any knowledge at all. Symon Patrick, who died Bishop of Ely in 1707, left an account of his ordination in his autobiography. He was of a pious Church family which had become somewhat confused by

the controversies of the age, and when the time came for him to take Orders as a condition of retaining his fellowship at Cambridge, he thought that the Presbyterian laying on of hands was sufficient, and received it from a presbytery in London. But he soon began to doubt its validity; he studied the Epistles of St Ignatius and Herbert Thorndike's *Of the Government of Churches*, and was convinced of the necessity of episcopal ordination. He learned that Bishop Hall, driven from his palace at Norwich, was living near the city, and went to him, together with two other fellows of his college and a third friend. The bishop examined and exhorted them, and ordained all four in his parlour, apparently to the diaconate and priesthood on one day. In time of persecution the ordinary discipline of the Church was in abeyance.

George Bull was a very precocious theological student, and he had never doubted that Presbyterian orders were invalid. He was but twenty-one when he presented himself to Bishop Skinner at Launton, and upon examination was found so well qualified that he was ordained deacon and priest in one day.

The rule that a candidate for the diaconate must have reached the age of twenty-three was not strictly kept, even when the Church was free. Long afterwards, in the reign of Anne, John Johnson in his *Vade Mecum* speaks of the common practice of bishops to ordain deacons under the prescribed age, of their own dispensation, though the faculty of which the rubric speaks should properly have been obtained from the archbishop. In the reign of George III the rubric was reinforced by a new statute, which enjoined that a candidate for the diaconate should have completed his twenty-third year, though it left untouched the archbishop's power to issue a faculty, and this statute was evidently designed to prevent a bishop from dispensing. Incidentally, if a bishop dispensed, the archbishop and his officials lost their faculty fees.

Ralph Brownrig, a Cambridge man of great distinction who had been consecrated to Exeter in 1641, appears unexpectedly among those who are known to have ordained secretly, for he was a curious blend of Calvinist and Churchman, and was actually a member of the assembly of divines. He escaped, therefore, Puritan harrying, but his stipend was gone, and he had to live in several places with hospitable friends; in the house of one of them at Sonning he ordained

the like-minded Edward Stillingfleet, who was consecrated to Worcester after the Revolution. Stillingfleet was succeeded at Worcester by William Lloyd; he also had been ordained priest by Brownrig, though he had been made deacon by Skinner.

More notable than these was Tenison, who was raised to the primacy. He was descended from a clerical family, and himself looked forward to ordination, but after taking his degree at Cambridge he had turned to the study of physic "upon the discouragement of the times." But an opportunity of fulfilling his vocation presented itself, and he was ordained by Brian Duppa, then living at Richmond after ejection from his see of Salisbury.

It is noteworthy that of the five bishops who had been secretly ordained only George Bull was definitely a High Churchman. Three, indeed, were as definitely "latitudemen" who would have been willing to reconcile dissenters to the Church by dangerously generous concessions. Yet all of them had so firm a belief in the transmission of the ministry through the episcopate alone that they were willing to take risks to obtain it.

There were other bishops of whom we might presume with some confidence that they privily ordained. William Juxon, Bishop of London, had retired to his manor of Little Compton, disarming suspicion by living as a hunting parson, keeping a pack of hounds which Cromwell expressly tolerated. But he read the Church service every Sunday at Chastleton House, and it is hardly to be doubted that he ordained there.

Bishops from outside the English provinces sometimes gave their assistance; in that point also necessity held the canon law in suspense. Evelyn's diary has an interesting entry about M. le Franc, "a young French Sorbonnist, a proselyte," who had been "brought to a full consent to the Church of England her doctrine and discipline." Dr Taylor and Evelyn procured his ordination by the Bishop of Meath, and Evelyn paid the fees to the bishop, who was very poor and in great want.

Those few were more fortunate who could be ordained, not in the guarded parlour of an evicted bishop's lodging, but in the one place where the English service could then be held openly and with dignity. On Trinity Sunday in 1650 John Evelyn witnessed the ordination in Sir Richard Browne's chapel at Paris of John Durel and Daniel Brevint,

very learned persons, as he observed, and afterwards to become the Deans of Windsor and Lincoln. Sydserff, Bishop of Galloway, preached a sermon on the dignity of the ministry, and the honour of entering it in the time of the Church's affliction. Then he proceeded to the ordination, Cosin, the ejected Dean of Peterborough, presenting the candidates. Then and for long after Cosin was chaplain to the Anglicans in the household of Queen Henrietta Maria; he had a free hand, and all was doubtless ordered with his accustomed regard for dignified ceremonial. The candidates were made deacon and priest at the same time, " in regard to the necessities of the times, there being so few bishops left in England, and consequently danger of a failure of both functions." Both Durel and Brevint were Jerseymen, and their knowledge of French was serviceable. Durel translated the Prayer Book into French, and his version was authorized for use in the Channel Islands and in the French Chapel of the Savoy, which he founded for the Channel Islanders resident in London. Brevint found employment in France as chaplain to royalties, and eventually died Dean of Lincoln. Bishop Sydserff who ordained them was old in years and in experience of persecution. He had been consecrated to Brechin, and translated to Galloway in the following year. He was a resolute churchman. Galloway was perhaps the most fanatically Presbyterian district in Scotland, and within three years Sydserff was attacked, assaulted, and given the honour of Presbyterian deposition and excommunication. There followed long years of wandering and poverty, but at the Restoration he received the rich see of Orkney as the only surviving bishop of those who had been driven out. Then the English Church which he had aided came to the aid of the Scottish, and four Scotsmen were consecrated in Westminster Abbey.

The Paris chapel was a spiritual home for many English exiles and travellers. It was a current jest that there only could Anglicans find the visible Church. It is probable, therefore, that other ordinations took place there, with no Evelyn to leave a record of them for posterity to read.

It was fortunate that the question of secret consecrations did not press urgently, though it would soon have had to be faced since the surviving bishops were growing older and fewer. Brian Duppa had been from the first concerned about the succession; he wrote to Sheldon in 1655 urging

that nothing was more important, since there was no prospect of a change in affairs. In 1659 he corresponded about it with Sir Edward Hyde, afterwards Lord Clarendon. Duppa was then over seventy years of age, and his anxieties were increasing with his years. But his fears were soon happily dispelled by the Restoration, and as the most important of the surviving bishops he had the happiness of consecrating Sheldon and four others, and of seeing all the sees filled by further consecrations within a few months.

It does not appear that the secret ordinations caused any difficulty when the Church resumed its normal life at the Restoration. Unscrupulous impostors might have taken the opportunity of claiming to be in Holy Orders; false claims are not unknown even today, under stringent conditions. But they do not seem then to have been made. To those who ordained and those who were ordained the repressed Church owed a debt for their courage in braving the penalties of the law.

What became of the bishops' registers? They were not diocesan archives, for ordination had been given without regard to diocesan jurisdiction. But they were of great importance, and it is to be supposed that they were deposited in places of safety, perhaps in the muniment rooms of the dioceses to which the bishops returned or were translated at the Restoration.

E. Hermitage Day.

MISCELLANEA

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

The Rev. W. W. S. March, B.D., was formerly Chaplain to the Bishop of Chichester, and is now serving as a Chaplain to the Forces.

Mr Prior was a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Otago, New Zealand, and is now working as a porter at an hotel in Dunedin.

Miss Irene Marinoff, Dr Phil. of the University of Marburg, B.A. of the University of London, was educated in Germany, and is well acquainted with German life and thought.

The Rev. Dr Hermitage Day, who is now resident in South Africa, was Editor of the *Church Times* from 1915 to 1924.

The Rev. J. R. H. Moorman, B.D., is Rector of Fallowfield, Manchester.

REVISED REVIEWS—XVI

Vie de S. François d'Assise. By Paul Sabatier. Paris, 1894.

In the year 1884 Ernest Renan, at the close of one of his lectures at Paris, placed his hand on the shoulder of one of his young students and said: "You will be the historian of the Seraphic Father." The young man was Paul Sabatier, who accepted the task which his teacher laid upon him, and, after ten years' work, produced the famous *Vie de S. François*. To publish any book which, in a few years, would run through over thirty editions and be translated into seven European languages would be a great achievement. When that book is the life of a thirteenth-century Italian saint the success borders upon the miraculous. But not only did the book itself achieve this enormous popularity, it led also to the foundation of two learned Societies,[1] to the inauguration of two series of publications,[2] and to a vast stream of literature about St Francis which has flooded the bookshops of Europe, and gives every appearance of going on for ever.

What was the secret of this enormous success? A glance at the *Vie de S. François* will give the answer. Not only is it an account of a remarkable and fascinating character, but it is also itself an outstanding work of art. As we read it we are irre-

[1] The Società Internazionale di Studi Francescani and the British Society for Franciscan Studies.

[2] *Collection d'Études et de Documents sur l'Histoire religieuse et littéraire du Moyen Age*, and *Opuscules de Critique Historique*.

sistibly carried away by the poetry and enthusiasm of the author himself, who seems to open a door through which we can pass into the Umbrian landscape of the thirteenth century and stand face to face with St Francis himself. To read this book (especially in youth) is a religious experience. St Francis comes alive in such a way that we can see the whole grandeur of his heroic experiment in taking Christ seriously, and even the Gospels themselves take on new light and new meaning. If it is true that no one can understand the Gospels without also understanding the interpretation of them which St Francis gave, then it is equally true that no one can begin to understand St Francis until he has read Sabatier's *Vie de S. François*.

And yet, when he has read it, he will still be a very long way from seeing the whole of what St Francis was and what he stood for. As an introduction to the Poverello this book is unsurpassed, but it needs to be supplemented by some more sober narrative, such as the scholarly Life by Father Cuthbert or (better still) by the original sources. For the more one reads about St Francis the more unsatisfying does this book become; and one can understand Leo XIII first giving it his blessing, and then changing his mind and putting it on the Index. It is, in fact, not a Life of St Francis, but a manifesto into which Sabatier poured all his emotions and all his prejudices.

Sabatier was a liberal and a modernist. He belonged to that school which believed that the freedom and purity of the Gospels had been hopelessly corrupted by the dogmatism of St Paul.[1] He wanted to get back to the " meek Galilæan " whose message of love and tenderness had been buried under centuries of legalism and sacerdotalism. And he saw in St Francis the exponent of his ideal. Sabatier's master, Renan, had called St Francis " the one perfect Christian";[2] the pupil set out to prove the truth of this judgment, starting from his own preconceived idea of what the perfect Christian would be like. So perfect, in fact, was St Francis in his eyes that anyone who offered even the mildest criticism of his projects was severely censured, and every effort on the part of authority to help the saint in the control of his unwieldy family was denounced as the most unwarrantable interference.

Theses are dangerous things, especially in the hands of a man of such strong emotions as Paul Sabatier. Good historian though he was, taking infinite pains to collect every scrap of evidence, he yet allowed himself to be carried away into state-

[1] For example, Sabatier has little to say in praise of St Anthony of Padua, whom he regards as a typical miracle worker of medieval legend. From St Francis to St Anthony, he says, " the descent is immense. The distance between these two men is as great as that which separates Jesus from St Paul " (pp. 147-8).

[2] *Nouvelles Études d'Histoire Religieuse*, p. 334.

ments and judgments which in anyone less sincere or less lovable would be regarded as monstrous.

Let us take an example. There are, in the primitive sources, one or two incidents in which Francis came into contact with Guido, Bishop of Assisi. In all these the Bishop appears as a kindly man who, if he did not altogether understand the uncompromising attitude of the saint, at least loved him very sincerely, and was anxious to give him as much help as he could. He encouraged and protected him in the dramatic scene when Francis renounced his father; he helped him to get an audience with Innocent III in 1210; and in the last few months of Francis's life he gave him hospitality and protection in his own house.[1] But Sabatier cannot accept all this. Francis represents the freedom of the natural child of God: Guido, just because he was a Bishop, must be made to represent the obscurantism of the Church. Consequently, when the Bishop says to Francis in the early days, " Your life seems to me to be hard and austere, to possess nothing in the world," Sabatier sees in this the first sign of official hostility and declares that Guido is already beginning " to rue the encouragement which he had formerly offered to the son of Bernardone " (p. 91). Again, when the Bishop met Francis in Rome, and smoothed the way for his audience with the Pope, Sabatier declares (totally against the evidence of Celano and the Three Companions) that " we may suspect that his commendations were not very warm " (p. 108). When the friars returned from Rome and settled at Rivo Torto, close to Assisi, Sabatier tells us that one cause of their popularity with the people was that " perhaps men suspected the ill-will of the Bishop and were happy to see him checked " (p. 125). Finally, when Francis lay dying in the Bishop's house in Assisi, we are told that the presence of so many friars about the place put the Bishop " a little out of humour," and it is suggested that Francis was sent down to the Portiuncula to die, not because it was his own wish, but because Guido wanted to get rid of him (p. 382). Contrary, therefore, to the evidence, which makes the Bishop of Assisi one of Francis's most consistent supporters, Sabatier describes him as, first, uneasy, then unhelpful, and finally malevolent, impatient and hostile. And he does this because his thesis demands that the official Church shall put as many obstacles as possible in the way of the " one perfect Christian."

Or, to take another example, Sabatier has a good deal to say about the relationship between Francis and Clare. We know that when Clare fled from her home to the Portiuncula she was met by St Francis, who received her into the Order and eventually settled her at S. Damiano. We know also that he corres-

[1] See *Legenda Trium Sociorum*, 19-20, 35, 47; 1 *Celano*, 15, 32; 2 *Celano*, 12, 220; *Spec. Perf.*, 10 (Francis's own tribute to the Bishop's kindness).

ponded with her from time to time, and consulted her (not personally, but through a messenger) as to whether he should devote himself to an active or to a contemplative life. Moreover, we know that when he wrote the " Canticle of the Sun " he was lying in a hut which Clare had erected in the garden at S. Damiano. So much is certain. The fourteenth-century collection of stories known as the *Fioretti* tells us (chap. xv) that Francis often visited Clare; but it also says that when she asked him to come and eat at the convent he refused, and, only when pressed by the brothers, went so far as to say that Clare might come to a meal at the Portiuncula. All this fits in with what Celano tells us (*2 Celano*, 112-4) of Francis's fear of familiarity with women, and with what Francis himself wrote in the Rule (*Regula Prima*, chap. xii). But it does not fit in with Sabatier's thesis. In order that Francis may be the perfect Christian he must be entirely at ease in the presence of women, and anyone who says anything else must be distorting the truth. Celano, who knew Francis personally, is totally ignored here,[1] and Sabatier builds up a fanciful picture of a sort of platonic friendship between Clare and Francis, the young girl sitting at his feet, soothing and consoling him, while Francis apparently regularly takes his place at the table of the Poor Clares (pp. 347-8).[2]

These examples will, I think, show Sabatier's weakness. He began with his conception of the perfect Christian and was determined to make St Francis fit into it. In spite of his critical study of the sources, he selects his material indiscriminately from the earliest legends, from the *Fioretti* and from the *Liber de Conformitate* of Bartholomew of Pisa, who wrote at the very end of the fourteenth century. Moreover, so passionate does he become that he is not above inventing incidents to prove some point. For example, in his anxiety to show the influence of Cardinal Ugolino on St Francis, he mentions (p. 275) " an ancient tradition of which his biographers have not preserved any trace," which tells of Ugolino carrying the saint off to a lonely spot in the Camaldoli. A few paragraphs later this is no longer regarded as " an ancient tradition " but as an historical fact, for Sabatier says (p. 278): " The sojourn at Camaldoli was prolonged until the middle of September, and it ended to the Cardinal's satisfaction." Or, again, Sabatier's distrust of visions puts him in a very difficult position in telling the story of the conversion of St Francis. The *Legend of the Three Companions*,

[1] " The relations of St Francis with women in general, and St Clare in particular, have been completely travestied by Thomas of Celano," says Sabatier (p. 170).

[2] This was supposed to take place in 1224-5. Yet, in 1223, Francis had written in the Rule that no friar was to enter a house of nuns (*Reg. Secunda*, chap. xi).

which Sabatier rightly considered of great importance, tells us that when Francis rode off to the war in Apulia he travelled the first day as far as Spoleto, where, during the night, he had a vision which convinced him that he must give up this project and return to Assisi (*Leg. 3 Soc.*, 6). But how does Sabatier deal with this? He tells us of the journey to Spoleto, and then writes: "What happened next? The documents do not say" (p. 21). But they do; and because Sabatier is not prepared to accept what they say he is driven to find some reason for Francis's precipitate return by inventing a story of his being persecuted by his fellow travellers!

From the point of view of the historian, therefore, this book is far from satisfactory. Sabatier admits that there is no such thing as "objective history" (p. xxv), but this does not give the biographer a free hand to say what he likes. Behind all our interpretations of a man's life lie the original sources—the words which he himself wrote and the accounts which others have given of him. It is from this raw material that we must start, not from some theory of how we should have liked things to be. If Sabatier had been content to build up his story of St Francis on the authentic evidence of the documents he would have produced something far more satisfactory and of much greater value.

And yet, with all its obvious faults, this remains a very great and lovable book. It does not tell us the truth about St Francis, any more than Giotto's backgrounds tell us the truth about what Assisi was like in the thirteenth century. And yet there is something irresistible about them both. If we want to know just what Francis said and did we must look elsewhere; but if we want to catch a glimpse of what he was, in all his simplicity and tenderness and selfless humility, we shall not get very far until we have made Paul Sabatier our guide.

JOHN R. H. MOORMAN.

NEW VERSE

Poems from the Forces[1] is significant in more ways than one. The editor, Keidrych Rhys, used to edit *Wales*, one of the little magazines which signified the dispersal of Bloomsbury from its geographical and political axis. He speaks for the dissident high-brow who has gone so far from the inter-war atmosphere that he is not sorry to be in the forces; in his introduction he turns some of his Celtic venom upon his own kind. But he knows that he is one of them, and he addresses one of his own poems to "Bill Empson," the most esoteric of all. The team he gathers around him includes Gavin Ewart and Rayner Heppenstall; the "Apocalyptics," Hendry, G. S. Fraser, Alun Lewis,

[1] Routledge, 6s.

John Prichard, and others already known to the little magazines. On the whole these come off better than the new arrivals who have taken to poetry during the war with no more equipment than is provided by an ordinary English education. Mr Rhys's discoveries are too often more literary in a bad sense than the literary birds. There is too much of

> " For the young world grieves
> That the world has known
> Long generations of despair,
> Has known the falling of the leaf,
> The whitening hair."

But many poets begin like that, and there is more promise in it than in the " lovely words, flowering out of lovely experience," of somebody else's amateur free verse, or the more accomplished metrics of two established conservative poets, Christopher Hassall and Lawrence Whistler. Mr Hassall's falling German airman is too much like an archangel in Milton:

> " Splendid, he prominently hangs,
> One moment brighter than the sun, then dark,
> So dark, the Future mourns her unborn lovers,
> Watching our element lay headlong claim
> To her strayed bodily possessions, wing
> And wheel, and this so foolish mountaineer,
> Of son and son in flaxen pedigree
> The last unlucky link. Still, still he falls,
> Dead ashes plumb the sky, cut it in two
> With a stick of charcoal. See, the Critic's at work. . . ."

He is, but with far too formal canons. This is the result of two much classical education, as the " lovely words " are the result of not enough education in literature at all.

Mr Whistler, a King's prize-winner, is another matter. Many readers of THEOLOGY, I fancy, will prefer " I come at once " to anything else in the book. And certainly in substance and manner he has arrived where

> " The church, remote and listening room,
> Was charged with honey-coloured gloom."

But I am not sure if I like the harvest-festival smell. Alan Rook, in " Fruits of the Earth," has got at the same things another way. The three main occupations in most of these poems are marriage (how many letters to wives !), religion (doubted and believed), and nationalism—not only among the Welsh; the English too

> " . . . listen where whispers of victory drown the sirens of anguish,
> And through the fog of murderous dreams,
> Drifting up, acrid and brown, I see the merciful,
> Miraculous dissolution of bombast and lust in an elemental Marlborough."

We read in the introduction: " All in all, this bombardier's (Lewis Halsey's) examination of the contradictions of our liberal-capitalist, anti-Fascist democracy was quite as illuminating as Lord Halifax's address at Oxford." " As good as Halifax " is a very revolutionary reaction from *The New Statesman*; but it is quite time that someone observed that Lord Halifax is the one elder statesman whose speeches reveal an acquaintance with modern poetry.

In substance these poems are encouraging. What most of them lack is defined by one of the best of them, Alun Lewis:

> " Deliberately to understate;
> To pare down to the quick
> Reality; to be
> In love articulate."

The Apocalyptics resort anew to romantic violence:

> " As the blood bubbles trumpets in their throats."

Some of this comes, I suspect, from the oriental imagination of the editor of *Poetry*, who in *Out of this War*[1] shows us " the hairy, long-armed men juggling with fire." (I am not at all sure that Tambimuttu's philosophy goes into English, but at least it has never been Englished before, and it does make pictures.) But a good deal of the trouble comes from Dylan Thomas and the Welsh twilight, haunted with religion and the Freudian fear of sex in religion. You get it at its worst in Glyn Jones's *Poems*:[1]

> " I felt my woody hair pour out
> Like water from my head,
> To see my nipples serpent-mouthed
> My sucking star-child dead."

In love and fear I prefer the new Faber poet, Mr Vernon Watkins, of *The Ballad of the Mari Lwyd*,[2] which is alive and does go with a swing, even if it leaves you in the same dark.

Mr Nicholas Moore figured in *The New Apocalypse*, but not in *Poems from the Forces*. He is very young, still chock-full of influences, and still naive about the future, but he seems to me one of the most promising of the new arrivals. He works through the poetry of love and marriage,[3] made very solemn and deliberate by the state of his generation, who deliberately return to it. But he brings in much else:

> " You look like fable, myth, and the fairy tale,
> But you are real as the boy was in the stable.
> What agony is to suffer will still be true,
> Though the future open like a flower in you."

[1] Fortune Press, 4s. 6d. [2] Faber, 6s.
[3] In *A Wish in Season* (Fortune Press, 4s. 6d.).

" Dear Sir and Father, History whom I believe,
Fate, Nature, accountable to all men,
Lead us, Earthly Angel, lead us from this dark night
Into a lighter bed and a happier Jerusalem;
For you, above all things, are universal,
A God to those who believe in God,
A party to those who believe in a party,

" A Christ to those who believe in a homo,
But not nothing, except to those who have died,
So I pray to you, bless my wife who is you,
And hope the future and you will be forever true."

Ronald Duncan is another kind of love-poet, almost immune to any influence but his earth and his girl and his experience, hostile to

" all the slack terminology
Of Mr Eliot's theology,
and Murry's apology
For Christ, and Leavis's crush on Lawrence,"

but memorable for his new words. In *Postcards to Pulcinella*,[1]

" fears slick gears
change and grate-
giving only brief
pneumatic-lorry-relief."

John Waller, of *Fortunate Hamlet*,[1] is best as a portrait painter of suburban ennui. When he goes beyond that there is not enough yet in " the gentle significance of all I tried to mean."

GEORGE EVERY, S.S.M.

KELHAM.

CORRESPONDENCE

DIVINE PROVIDENCE

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

Mr Lampert's admirable paper on Divine Providence encouraged the hope of a more spiritual conception of the origin and destiny of man than that which Western theology envisages —namely, to the view that perhaps Origen, " whose teaching rests not on a metaphysical but on an ethical basis " (Kidd), may have been right after all, or at least more right than Augustine; yet in order to avoid this heretical conclusion he is obliged in the end to invent a mediating term between time and

[1] Fortune Press, 4s. 6d.

eternity—" super-time, which already precontains in the integral the differential of time "—in order to account for the supra-temporal self-determination of freedom which he has already established. His real discovery—namely, that freedom pertains to the realm of the eternal and not of the temporal—is invalidated by this second thought, which is but a metaphysical *tour de force*, introduced as a safeguard to Western theology. It is introduced in order to avoid a conclusion which " would make creation co-eternal with the Creator." Is creature, then, to be taken as the first and the last word to describe man's real relationship to the Source of his being? Is it not rather the case that, according to the very essential genius of the Christian faith, " as many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the *sons of God*, even to them that believe on His name; which were begotten, not of the will of the flesh nor of the will of man, but of God "? " Of His own will begat He us, through the Word of Truth." Surely this is precisely the teaching of the whole of the New Testament—" children of God, but if children then heirs. . . ." But this, unfortunately, is not the teaching of Western theology. It is the bane of this theology that it must make faith dependent on metaphysics, the clear intuition of the free spirit on the deliverances of discursive reason. And this with the inevitable result of a *reductio ad absurdum*. The doctrine of predestination, for example, as advanced by Augustine and carried to its logical conclusion by his successors, involves that the only capacity which freedom of the will can claim is the capacity to sin, a fallacy which Moberly exposed long ago, but which dogmatism finds it convenient to forget. It is the bane of Western theology so to objectivize and externalize the content of the faith, so to intellectualize it, that the flame of the spirit is in danger of being smothered in the smoke of metaphysics. Far better for theology had Mr Lampert maintained his original thesis without qualification.

Yours sincerely,
George Seaver.

To the Editor of Theology.

Dear Sir,

Too much ink and paper has already been wasted in past centuries for the discussion of the correct interpretation of St Augustine's doctrine of Grace, Freewill and Predestination. I would not intrude upon your space to the extent necessary to reopen that tedious controversy, but I think that something must be said regarding the strange caricature of later Western doctrine and theology which Mr Lampert presents to the readers of your April number.

However, since Mr Lampert assures us that, " in the contro-

versy against Pelagianism, St Augustine has become the true progenitor of the doctrine of Predestination, which later developed so much in Roman Catholic theology" (the comma is his), it may be desirable to recall that there is already a pretty emphatic doctrine of Predestination in the epistles of St Paul. There is also ample evidence that some of the Eastern Fathers, although unafflicted with the necessity of giving the matter such close attention as did St Augustine, held a quite definite doctrine on the subject also. Though I do not think it becomes us Westerns to teach Easterns their own theology with the same assurance with which they are sometimes inclined to teach us ours, it may further be noted that the "Orthodox Confession of Faith of the Catholic and Apostolic Eastern Church," as well as the Confession of Dositheos, proclaim the doctrine of Predestination in a manner which, to a Western Catholic nourished by SS. Augustine and Thomas and the Council of Trent, can leave little or nothing to be desired. The obstacles in the way to the reunion of East and West are considerable enough without the erection of private theologies into *denominational* differences where none had hitherto been suspected to exist.

Mr Lampert continues:

> This [*i.e.*, "doctrine of Predestination, which later developed in Roman Catholic theology"] was connected with the denial of free-will, which in fallen man is expressed in the natural tendency to sin; by divine compulsion ("indeclinabilis et insuperabilis") grace saves a certain number of the elect out of the whole "massa perditionis." This thought left its mark on Catholic theology in Thomism, which accepted the central Augustinian idea of predestination to salvation, although it hesitated in face of predestination to damnation. This received its formal expression in the Tridentinum.

All ambiguity as to the manner in which this doctrine of Predestination is supposed to be "connected" with the denial of freewill is set aside when Mr Lampert writes later that, according to Western theology (explicitly including Thomism):

> All activity and all freedom remain in the last resort on the side of God, and all passivity and all plasticity on the side of man, who cannot have freedom as an ontological faculty of resistance in himself. In this way the whole living reality of man's destiny seems to become a pointless game of the Deity with its creation, a void and meaningless farce.

It is difficult to know what to make of this travesty. Is it really necessary to point out that the Council of Trent and St Thomas and *all* Catholic theologians alike *affirm* freewill categorically and repeatedly (however differently different theologians may attempt to *explain* it), or that for "Roman Catholic theology" freewill is unquestionably *de fide*, and the denial of it rank and fundamental heresy? It would consume a whole issue of Theology even to begin to quote the relevant texts which might

be adduced to prove the point. Yet surely it would not have been difficult for your contributor to consult Denzinger's collection of doctrinal pronouncements or an index to the works of St Thomas—or *any* Catholic theologian—before perpetrating so extraordinary a howler.

The following sentence about " divine compulsion " is hardly more excusable. It is *de fide* that divine grace does *not* compel, and the doctrine that grace is irresistible is *anathematized* by Trent in the most express terms. There is scarcely a phrase in the Decrees and Canons of the Sixth Session of the Council of Trent that does not, explicitly or implicitly, give the lie to the fantastic picture of Tridentine doctrine which Mr Lampert has conjured up.

When he tells us that Thomism " hesitated " in the face of predestination to damnation he achieves a prodigy of understatement. St Thomas, and all Thomists after him, *deny* and *repudiate* predestination to damnation in the most formal terms. It is excluded by their very definition of predestination. There was no room for a moment's " hesitation " in the matter. Predestination to evil had been formally condemned by the Second Council of Orange in 529 and by Boniface II in 531. The intricate logomachy concerning the legitimacy of " gemina predestinatio " had been decided negatively and conclusively during the Gotteschalk affair.

I confess that I do not quite understand Mr Lampert's strictures on " Western theology " in its treatment of the inter-relation of Providence and Predestination. But it may be relevant to recall that the first thing St Thomas tells us in his Question on Predestination in the *Summa* (I, xxiii) is that it is " pars providentiæ." The student of this Question will certainly soon find that it is unintelligible except in the light of the previous Question on Providence, to which it constantly refers back.

We are then told that, " . . . for Augustinianism and Thomism . . . God, in His providence about the world and man, remains transcendent, acts on him from without, as on a mere product of divine activity." And later, " . . . it is implied that the world remains quite outside God, and God outside the world; for God's action in the world is understood precisely as a *super*-natural intervention of grace. . . ." At this point the impression is difficult to avoid that Mr Lampert is determined to pick a quarrel at any price. It is true that theologians—Eastern as well as Western—employ such spatial language. But the veriest novice in theology could have informed him that God has no " inside " or " outside "; nothing " above " or " beneath " Him in any spatial and literal sense; that spatial metaphors of " in " and " out " applied to extra-spatial reality signify only distinction; that " supra " and " infra," so applied, signify only distinction of value. It is difficult to believe that your contributor could be wholly ignorant of these elementary principles,

even if lacking the scientific technique necessary to appreciate the fully-elaborated Thomist treatment of divine transcendence and omnipresence. Such disciplined study of the use of spatial terminology in theology might also have preserved him from solecism in his estimation of the meaning to be attached to temporal terminology and metaphor also, as when he writes that in Thomism "God is conceived in one logical plane in time with the world." But it would have sufficed had he pondered the *Summa*, I, xxii, 1 ad 2, and considered that *pre*-destination, like *pro*-vidence, is strictly and literally *previous*, not to the creature with respect to God (*i.e.*, *in ordine intentionis*), but in respect to his own factual attainment of his end (*i.e.*, *in ordine executionis*).

I do not purpose to intrude further on your space to discuss Mr Lampert's own valuable *positive* contribution to the subject. I would only say that, as an Augustinian, a Thomist and a "Tridentine," I can find in it—apart from some unqualified phraseology—little that is unacceptable or even unfamiliar; less that is not implicit in the integral doctrine of SS. Augustine and Thomas themselves—apart, perhaps, from his singularly illuminating observations regarding reincarnation. I would only suggest that his positive contribution is quite capable of standing on its own feet without the support of grotesque Aunt Sallies, gratuitously labelled "Western," "Thomist" and "Roman Catholic." It is my privilege to be personally acquainted with Mr Lampert's zealous work for Christian unity. Such unaccountably careless writing can only darken counsel and injure the cause he holds so dear.

Yours, etc.,
VICTOR WHITE, O.P.

BLACKFRIARS, OXFORD.

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

I have read Mr Seaver's valuable letter with interest, and am glad of the possibility of clarifying my thought, although I must confine myself here to a few observations only.

Mr Seaver's chief objection is concerned with my introduction of a "mediating term between time and eternity," which he thinks invalidates the eternal nature of human freedom. My aim was not to provide a "safeguard for Western theology," nor does it, I think, invalidate my own argument. I only attempted to answer the question which inevitably arises here—the question of the relation between *time and eternity*. This question has a supremely existential significance, and is far from *abstract* metaphysics. I think I have in sufficiently strong terms established the *eternal* nature of human freedom, for truly

man is a child of eternity, as Mr Seaver admirably says. But man's self-determination in eternity *faces time* and is actualized in it. Time is real not only in time but in eternity; *time is real for God.* It is therefore essential to realize that between time, where human life unfolds, and eternity, where it is rooted, there is a *correlation*: time is grounded in eternity (" super-time, which in the integral contains the differential of time "). But at the same time there is a *hiatus* between them (creation is not *simply* co-eternal with the Creator). In virtue of this simultaneous correlation and hiatus the living, concrete antinomy between divine and human freedom arises. The divine-human destiny of man rests on the knife-edge of this antinomy.

I do not pretend that my answer is wholly satisfactory; but I fear that in his criticism Mr Seaver is not sufficiently aware of the very problem arising here. Origen definitely ignored it, for to him creation in time is simply a " falling away " (*καταβολή*) from a higher state to a lower one.

I have less pleasure in answering Fr Victor White's letter, which I read with mixed feelings. I am sorry that Fr White, whom I value as a theologian and Christian thinker, has, it seems, on this occasion failed to get at the root of the question, and has obviously written his letter under the influence of rather superficial impressions. I do not think that the cause of Christian unity is hindered by frank discussion, by confrontation and inevitable differences of interpretation; but this cause is certainly hindered by the tone of Fr White's letter.

In the first place I am led to ask what brings Fr White to the strange conclusion that I am making " private (?) theology " into a denominational difference; all the more so, since he himself is able to find this theology " implicit in the doctrine of SS. Augustine and Thomas "? However, I do *not* think that the latter is possible, and unfortunately Fr White gives no proofs of his statement. Such proofs would, in fact, have been the only relevant and interesting answer to my article. Instead of this, he embarked on a series of details, which I shall now endeavour to answer.

I do not think that it is quite unlawful to regard St Augustine as the true progenitor of the theology of Predestination. Neither St Paul nor the Eastern Fathers have any plain and systematic teaching on this subject. As to the " Orthodox Confession of Faith . . ." which Fr White seems to regard as a symbolic book of the Orthodox Church, he should know that leading Orthodox theologians are agreed in estimating it as a rather giftless plagiarism of second-rate Western scholasticism. I feel it necessary, however, to state once more that my criticisms have no denominational character, and are in fact explicitly directed, not only to " Roman Catholic," but to current theology in general, and especially to current Western theology.

In the following polemics, where Fr White accuses me of " fantastic misrepresentations," " travesty " and " howlers," it seems to me that to a large extent he is battering at an open door. I *nowhere* affirm that the Tridentine Council or Thomism deny free-*will*, or affirm the irresistible nature of divine grace. My statements to this effect, as is clear from the context, refer to Augustinianism, which incidentally, as Fr White would scarcely deny, *did* leave its mark on Catholic theology in Thomism.[1] Nevertheless I do, in fact, believe that both Augustinianism and Thomism are incapable of expressing the mystery of human freedom in all its ontological depth. Perhaps I am wrong, but Fr White has not yet told me how this is possible. He seems to be unaware of the fundamental difference between *freewill* and *freedom*. The question of freewill is not really my subject at all in the article. Speculations about freewill have to a large extent been dominated by the concern of affirming or denying the merits of good works, or have been closely bound up with the question of the fate of man in the next world. The problem of freedom, on the other hand, is concerned with the primordial relation between God and man, with the supreme mystery of divine-human being. My contention that Thomism does not exhaust this mystery is based on the fact that its terminology is incapable of expressing an ontologically *reciprocal* relation between God and man, because God is conceived as the unmoved Mover, as perfect Substance and pure Act, self-enclosed and self-sufficient in His absolute being. Yet there is not only a one-way relation of man to God, there is not only a longing of the human for the divine, but also a longing of the divine for the human, however untheological or " phraseologically unqualified " this may sound to Fr White. This reciprocity is at the basis of the creation of man and divine Providence about him. Without it man becomes passive in the hands of God, " a mere product of divine creation " ; without it there is no human freedom as self-determination to being and existence.

Finally, I must remark that my criticism of spacio-temporal language is far from being determined by the desire to " pick a quarrel at any price " or by a lack of the most elementary information, but is in fact much more than a terminological disagreement. Actually I think that such language has had a fatal influence on Christian thought, which was objectivized and exteriorized by it, and should be radically eliminated from both Christian philosophy and theology. Such is, above all, the notion of first cause, which inevitably conceives God " in one logical plane with the world," for causality belongs to the world of a continuous, unbroken, mechanical being, one in

[1] I will not dispute Fr White's protest against the word " hesitate " as to the rejection of predestination to damnation. Yet from what I said about Jansenius and Calvin it is obvious that my use of this word does not imply uncertainty.

movement and causal connexion. And the arbitrary and contradictory idea of a free or uncaused cause as applied to God by Aristotle and his Christian spokesmen " profiteth not," and does not bring us nearer to the reality of the living relation between God and the world. The same applies to all other traditional spacio-temporal terms in theology. Our theological language should be nearer to the living mysteries of divine and human life and existence, and free itself, as my first critic rightly says, from the intellectual smoke of abstract metaphysics.

I hope Fr White will forgive my, perhaps, too polemical answer to his letter; but, alas! it is he who provoked me.

Yours sincerely,

E. Lampert.

SELL THAT THOU HAST

To the Editor of Theology.

Sir,

The Church's concern is with truth, and not with popularity, and in her relation to the social order it is of importance that she should take her bearings from the New Testament rather than from the *New Statesman*. It is not for her the one thing needful to be on the winning side in social politics. If it were, she might indeed be well advised to bear in mind that a vociferous propaganda is not necessarily the index of a numerical majority, and that to be stampeded by it is no mark of worldly wisdom. Whether one likes it or not, Lord Elton is historically correct in stating that in this country Conservatives have long been a permanent majority of all classes (*Saint George or the Dragon*, p. 122). But the preaching of the Gospel is not governed by considerations of political opportunism. It would, no doubt, be a disaster if the Church of England were to scramble onto the wrong political band-waggon. But it would be a much greater disaster that the Church of England should scramble onto any political band-waggon at all. The Church is concerned for justice, and therefore for social justice; consequently she must not be committed to any political or economic system, because under every political and economic system miscarriages of social justice can and do occur, and it is her prophetic mission to denounce them. No timorous instinct for appeasement can justify her in identifying the Social Gospel with Conservatism or with Collectivism or with Communism when the New Testament offers her no warranty for doing so. The sacred volume is not in any ordinary sense concerned with social arrangements; it prescribes no specific method for the ownership and exploitation of the economic resources of the world; it does not condemn either Capitalism or Collectivism. What it does condemn are the vices to which men as men are

liable under any political or economic system—avarice, dishonesty (intellectual as well as financial, and perhaps intellectual even more than financial), the lust for power, and worldliness. The antithesis of the New Testament is not between public and private ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange, but between the Kingdom and the World. Unhappily there is a considerable element of truth in the Rev. R. H. Le Messurier's indictment that the Church tends to produce good citizens of the world slightly tinged with Christian sentiments, although the Church is by no means peculiar in this; but it is sheer materialism to suppose that this evil could be eradicated merely by an alteration in her financial arrangements, and it is sheer dishonesty to suppress the fact that under the existing system she has not ceased to produce heroes and martyrs of the faith. And, whatever may be imagined to the contrary, in this present epoch the characteristic thing is not that the Church has tried to come to terms with the world, but that the world has tried to come to terms with the Church.

But Mr Le Messurier wants the Church to come to terms with the world. He wants her to do a deal with what he takes to be the rising power in our domestic politics. The people from whom he gets his ideas—or, to be more accurate, his *clichés*—dislike the Church and dislike the capitalist system, and so he thinks that if the Church will even now appease them by washing her hands of the capitalist system, they may be induced to like, or at least to tolerate, the Church. It is a curious and interesting point that those who make no concealment of their belief that the Church truckles to the Right, and that it is very wicked of her to do this, are commonly the most insistent that the Church must truckle to the Left, and that it will be highly virtuous for her to do that. It was not, I think, a Christian—and certainly not a New Testament scholar—who coined the phrase *le bon sansculotte Jésus*; but it, or at least the idea behind it, has been exploited by many Christians (again not New Testament scholars) to supply an emotional justification for their political prejudices and demands, and particularly for the demand that other people shall make sacrifices. (Yet, as Dean Inge has remarked, " though I bestow all my neighbour's goods to feed the poor, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.") There is nothing new in all this. But there is an element of real and even startling novelty in the particular method of appeasement proposed by the Rev. R. H. Le Messurier in the April number of Theology which deserves a moment's consideration.

Our author bids us know that he has " had somewhat unique opportunities of meeting men and women in all walks of life," and has thereby been enabled to discover that the reasons why they are indifferent and even hostile to the Church today are, first, that " she is ' supporting the war,' " and, second, that " she is wedded to capitalism " and possesses " enormous shares

in industrial resources," " a tremendous interest in the industrial and economic resources of the world, and of this country in particular," and consequently " her influence is bound to be a reactionary one." A great many of these men and women in all walks of life are, as he admits, hazy about details and misinformed in other respects: a disadvantage which they appear to share with Mr Le Messurier. But this does not seem to matter. The main point is clear: if the Church hopes to be permitted to continue as an institution under the modified form of Communism which our author apparently envisages as the outcome of this war, she had better get out of this unchristian, not to say unpopular, capitalist system while the going is good, and on the best available terms. For " if the Church does not voluntarily give up her vested interests they will soon be taken from her in any case, with or without compensation." Whatever Government may be in power is bound to carry through a policy of disendowment in, say, ten years' time. Rather than wait for this to happen, let the Church rise to the issue *now*. " Let her sell her stocks and shares, and turn them into cash. . . . Let her live *on* her capital, not *by* her capital." The Religious Orders and (presumably) the Missionary Societies are not excluded. This " strong, drastic and dramatic action " may be calculated to " convince the world," if not of sin, of righteousness and of judgment, yet at least " of the Church's penitence, sincerity and honesty "; and, anyway, the procedure ought to keep us going for another twenty-five years (Mr Le Messurier's age may be conjectured from the fact that he graduated at McGill University, Montreal, in 1922), after which, if the trick hasn't worked, if the world remains unconvinced and " the workers " unpropitiated, if the Church's dramatic challenge to the world, despite " its crystal-clear purity," has somehow failed to get across, then, to the mind of our author, the institution may be safely left to the Official Receiver and the future to the Holy Spirit.

There are two comments to be made on this ingenious proposal. The first is that, to the untutored reader, its lofty idealism seems almost indistinguishable from cynical effrontery. The second is that for Mr Le Messurier the authority of the Malvern Conference (as he understands it) is evidently of more immediate weight than that of Scripture. To this latter source his thesis is conspicuously unindebted. The principal basis of his argument is his own prejudices and preconceptions and the usual run of tawdry second-hand sophistries that no self-respecting don would tolerate in an undergraduate essay, and of which his opening sentence is a peculiarly fertile illustration. The theology of the New Testament is neither here nor there; we are even invited to believe that Christ was crucified " because He would not compromise with the world's system of His day," ostensibly the contemporary equivalent of capitalism. The

only direct Biblical reference is to our Lord's words to the young man who had great possessions, " If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast . . ." (Matt. xix, 21); and it is noteworthy that Mr Le Messurier does not continue the quotation (" . . . and give to the poor "). Whether it is in any case legitimate to generalize from a saying addressed to a particular individual under particular circumstances may, of course, be debated. But what is evident to the meanest capacity—and this is the real answer to Mr Le Messurier—is that what our Lord did *not* say to the rich young ruler was: " Look here, old chap, it's a fairly safe bet that there's going to be a capital levy in the course of the next few years, so it really is your moral duty to sell out the properties of which you are a trustee and to convert them into ready money; with luck this is just the kind of gesture that ought to conciliate the workers and to convince them of our integrity and of the other-worldliness of our Gospel; and anyway the proceeds ought to last you out for your time, and you can let posterity fend for itself."

Admittedly, however, there is something very unhealthy—and here Mr Le Messurier's instinct is assuredly correct—in the spectacle of a Church complacently living on its inheritance from the piety of past generations (an inheritance depleted by an occasional raid by the State, like the recent tithe legislation) and paying its clergy from that source, while expecting them as far as possible to supplement their stipends and to discharge their charities from private income. I hope that I may live to see the day when the Church's work will be adequately financed by the current contributions of her members. At present the burden of sacrifice rests chiefly upon the shoulders of the clergy, of whom, however, the Bible says that the labourer is worthy of his hire. As is well known, the Dissenting laity, both Catholic and Protestant, do recognize their responsibility to maintain their clergy and the work of their Churches to a degree that still puts the laity of the Establishment to shame. Were the Anglican laity to face their responsibilities in equal measure, the income from inherited properties should not be needed, if this were held to be desirable. But this would involve a readier acceptance on the part of the laity of the demands of the Gospel; and the initiative lies, and must lie, with them.

Yours truly,

CHARLES SMYTH.

CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGE.

CONCERNING ECONOMICS

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

Mr Preston, in his second contribution, describes his first attack upon me as "blunt." It seems a just description. But acuteness, rather than bluntness, is necessary in this discussion, and Mr Preston is not acute. His whole suggestion that I have committed a deplorable *faux pas* in expressing an economic conception which differs from his own views involves the supposition that he represents an authoritative and established body of economic doctrine. Since there is notoriously no such body of doctrine today, Mr Preston has gratuitously created difficulties for himself.

Moreover, forced now by the weight of Dr Barlow's argument, he is found to admit that "metaphysical presuppositions underlie any approach to knowledge." It would be interesting to learn whether Mr Preston has examined the metaphysical presuppositions of those economists with whom he happens to agree. However, since his admission undermines his whole position, he seeks to have it both ways, and goes on to plead for some precious corner of "knowledge" to which the admission does not apply. He proceeds to lecture Dr Barlow and myself on the assumption that, after all, economics is an objective science, having, at least in great areas of its own field, no need of any awareness of a theology or a metaphysic, and not to be submitted to any ethical criterion. (I was sure that sooner or later he would quote Professor Robbins.)

There is no such objective science. There are certain data which economic theory at any particular time must respect. But man has the power to modify many of the data, and to create others far beyond the power of economic science to foresee. And his action which has the power to transform the whole subject-matter of economic enquiry must be judged by its measure of accordance with some dogmatic conception of human nature and purpose. The school to which I belong lays great emphasis upon this consideration in view of a situation in which human achievements in the economic sphere have actually embarrassed mankind for lack of a direction arising from an ultimate philosophy.

I will not comment upon the obvious passion for the obsolete which Mr Preston displays. I can well understand that to a merely pragmatic economic theory which has accepted certain phenomena of "expansion" as of permanent validity, the suggestion that work can ever make work impossible is meaningless. Yet it is only a truism. Nor is it necessary to suppose that "crude" theories of under-consumption are the only ways of justifying such a phrase. I will not suppose that Mr Preston

believes over-production to have been the cause of our woes, for the term is meaningless. It can have reference to the total human power to consume—and there is certainly as yet no general over-production in this sense; or it may refer to the preponderance of production over the distributive mechanism. In this case the mechanism comes up for judgment, and the world will need a deal of convincing that it cannot be drastically changed in accordance with human need.

Perhaps Mr Preston believes in under-production. So do I. But in my view this is not due to factors beyond human control. It is due to the inability of the distributive system, and chiefly to the fact that an obsolete monetary mechanism attempts to implement a rapidly-advancing productive technique. It is of the very nature of this situation that any success in stimulating the distribution of production in one place must inevitably tend to defeat attempts to distribute other production. The distributive mechanism is unable to carry further the economic expansion for which our whole economic structure has been built. Hence work tends to make work impossible. It has actually done so.

A further illustration of Mr Preston's failure even to understand the position he attacks is to be seen in his remarks about Germany. Had he been more acute than blunt, he would have seen that Germany is an overwhelming demonstration of the proof of my analysis. What he says of Germany is true enough: but it is this that marks the differentiation of Germany from the dominant world economic. Germany deliberately retired from a world market which the Nazi pundits had the sense to see was inevitably declining. But there is no general agreement to follow the example.

Mr Preston evidently has much to learn concerning the inwardness of the new economics which is receiving ever-increasing support, as witness the notable articles recently published in *The Times*. I have not the slightest desire to offer myself as his tutor; but I am even less disposed to accept him as mine. And if it comes to a question of what is actually believed by eminent economists upon these subjects I can offer him some information of which he appears to stand in need.

Yours sincerely,
W. G. Peck.

BOOK REVIEWS

GREY EMINENCE. By Aldous Huxley. Chatto and Windus. 15s.

" The nature of Fr Joseph's life is such that the record of it can hardly fail to raise, in an enquiring mind, a number of questions not directly related to that biography. These questions are all more or less puzzling, but so intrinsically important that the historian of this strange career would be doing less than his duty if he failed at least to try to answer them." This is the first paragraph of the tenth chapter of Mr Aldous Huxley's new book, the biography of François Leclerc du Tremblay, " known in religion as Father Joseph of Paris, and to anecdotal history as L'Eminence Grise." But the sub-title proclaims it to be " a Study in Religion and Politics," and the opening words of Chapter X (itself headed " Politics and Religion ") indicate what Mr Huxley is really trying to do. He is trying to answer the puzzling and important questions, " What is religion ?" " What is politics ?" and " How are religion and politics related ?" Formally, the book is historical biography, and the reader can find much that is instructive and interesting in it. Moreover, the author would appear to have studied his seventeenth-century sources with some care. But the real interest and importance of the book lie in the fact that it is a further contribution to religious and political thinking by an author who has already acquired a public disposed to listen to him in these spheres. The late Abbé Bremond dropped a hint that the life of Fr Joseph, a mystic, but a mystic *in partibus infidelibus* because he was the right-hand man of Richelieu, Prime Minister of France, provided a suitable theme for the moralist. Mr Huxley has swallowed the suggestion with appetite, interested as he seems to have become in mystical religion, and interested as he has been for some time in the fundamental problems of politics. The book has, and is meant to have, a direct bearing upon the contemporary situation.

The key to the book is the author's conception of religion. It is a conception that we have met before. "To a non-Christian," writes Mr Huxley, " this seems the supremely important, the eminently encouraging fact about mysticism—that it provides the basis for a religion free from unacceptable dogmas, which themselves are contingent upon ill-established and arbitrarily interpreted historical facts." This position is substantially identical with that of William James and Irving Babbitt. It is what Mr. T. S. Eliot has called " canned Buddhism ": Buddhism, because these writers (or at least Babbitt and Huxley) profess

to find in oriental mysticism something which, to a greater extent than the mysticism of the West, sits loose to metaphysics and theology; and "canned," because they have taken an experience and separated it "from all the traditional ways of behaving and feeling which went to make it a living religion in its own environment, which made it a religion possible for every level of intelligence and sensibility from the highest to the lowest." Mr Huxley shows how Fr Joseph was trained in the mystical school of Benet of Canfield and Bérulle, a school which had departed in certain respects from the medieval tradition descending from the Pseudo-Dionysius and blossoming, for instance, in "the Cloud of Unknowing." He argues that this departure polluted the springs of spiritual religion by substituting for a mysticism independent of dogma and ecclesiasticism a mysticism subject to the criteria of Catholic dogma and practice. Fr Joseph started, therefore, with a handicap. The mystical side of his nature was stunted in that, instead of piercing through to the imageless Godhead, his spirit stopped short at the image of the Crucified. He finally went astray, so Mr Huxley explains, because the other side of his character, sensitive to the political thought of the time and also to contemporary ideas of Providence, committed him to a political career as Richelieu's collaborator. Furthermore, becoming L'Eminence Grise and the second man in France, if not in Europe, he carried astray with him most of European history.

This thesis is presented and argued with much force and conviction, and the book will no doubt deeply impress a wide circle of readers. This review must restrict itself to pointing out certain characteristics and consequences of the author's opinions which show themselves in the book.

The appeal of undogmatic and experimental mysticism at the present time is not difficult to understand. Canon Quick pointed out thirty years ago, in criticizing the theses of William James and Evelyn Underhill (*Journal of Theological Studies*, 1912), the intellectual advantage of a purely mystical as opposed to an historical religion. Taking the mystical side, it seemed possible to appeal directly to experience and to evade the difficulties arising out of historical and scientific criticism. To that advantage, the appeal of which is explicitly admitted by Mr Huxley, there is now to be added an advantage with an appeal subtler and more potent than could have been felt in the era before the world wars and the collapse of civilization, an appeal the force of which may be observed in several writers less distinguished than Mr Huxley. The way of the mystics, and of the oriental mystics in particular, is the way of world denial. For them the temporal world is, in practice, if not always in theory, unacceptable. It is not, therefore, surprising to observe a swing from an undogmatic, undenominational world-accepting sub-Christianity doing duty when the world was more or less accept-

able, to an undogmatic, undenominational world-renouncing one when the acceptability of the world has become more open to doubt. From ethics more or less without religion we swing to religion more or less without ethics. From a world where nearly nothing was evil we move to a world where nearly nothing is good. To a God somehow co-extensive with the world, and therefore accessible without difficulty, succeeds a God who is transcendent and inscrutably oblivious of the world and accessible only to specialists. The weakness of such a position makes itself apparent in *Grey Eminence*. For while we have an excellent account of the nature and methods of mystical religion and an almost intolerably vivid picture of the horrors of unregenerate humanity in the seventeenth (and in any other) century, we finish with the feeling that the author is stretching a point, and even descending to ambiguity, when he maintains that the former, as he understands it, can ever make much impression upon the latter. Any view which identifies religion with religious experience and religious experience with the higher forms of mystical experience must be weak at the crucial point—at the point where the link must be found between the inner life and external action. Such a view must tend to reduce the statement that it is impossible to serve two masters to a counsel of despair.

Whereas the liberals solved the problem of relating religion to life by eliminating religion, the logic of the neo-mystics—though Mr Huxley tries to limit its operation—would seem to solve it by eliminating life. They are content to live in a disintegrated world, a world which is apparently to be defined as Chaos. Not only is there no organic relation between religion and natural life, there is no intelligible relation between religion and natural knowledge. Over against a scientific naturalism which rejects metaphysics and theology, Mr Huxley and his like are content to set up an empirical supernaturalism which likewise rejects them. It is more than likely that Fr Joseph misapplied his criteria or that they did not come his way. But Mr Huxley dismisses any integrating doctrine of Providence and any theology of ends as so much needless baggage. It is more than likely that the Counter-Reformation went too far in its criticism of mysticism. But Mr Huxley regards the application of all theological criteria to mystical experience as harmful. All this, as Mr Eliot has pointed out, represents an advanced stage of decadence, and is reminiscent of the phenomena of the later Roman Empire. There is no desire to recognize the rational necessity of a metaphysic that could comprehensively approach the problem of ends, and, in particular, no inclination to appreciate the cogency of the dogma of the Incarnation, knitting up, as it does, a system in which the Divine Transcendence and the Divine Immanence are organically poised. But Mr Huxley

has no place for Faith in his scheme, and where there is no Faith rationalism must do service for reason.

There is no denying the excellence of this book, but there is a quality in it which is artificiality rather than art. His assertions are a little too assertive and his theme a little too final. There is a defect of sympathy which detracts from the value of the book both as a study of Fr Joseph and as a critique of the ordinary ideas of humanity. This quality, we may suspect, is not unconnected with a species of aristocratic detachment inseparable from so intellectualist a standpoint.

Brian Wormald.

Cambridge.

Stages on Life's Way. By S. Kierkegaard. Translated by Walter Lowrie. Oxford University Press. 30s.

People are already beginning to complain that we have heard too much of Sören Kierkegaard, and many who began enthusiastically with Dr Lowrie's massive and satisfying biography, which, as its author says, " comes as near as possible to being his autobiography," and followed it courageously with several of the volumes so admirably produced by the Oxford Press, may be forgiven if they experienced a failure of resolution when they proposed to themselves a continuation of their study. This present volume, *Stages on Life's Way*, fills some four hundred and sixty pages, and of that part of it called *Quidam's Diary* Dr Lowrie, whose complete candour shines all through his hero-worship, admits: " I am tired of reading it all, and find it still more tiresome to translate it."

For Dr Lowrie is a hero-worshipper and the " tremendous little Dane " is his hero. And it is well for us that he loves Kierkegaard, for, as Augustine says, " Non intratur in veritatem nisi per caritatem," and for this reason Dr Lowrie's study of S. K., as he lovingly and conveniently calls him, is more satisfying than the useful little books by Dr Allen and Dr Bain. On this question Dr Lowrie has a pungent footnote, in which he reveals to us the fact that he keeps a little bronze statue of S. K. on his study table, with flowers placed before it by Mrs Lowrie, so that, as he charmingly adds, " it remains doubtful whether the offering be not meant for me."

But we have always Theodor Haecker's critical essay on S. K. to fall back on, in which Haecker, a Roman Catholic and a man of fine perception, shows us how to disentangle what is of permanent value in S. K.'s thought from what, although it belongs inseparably to him, is yet " temporal and fortuitous." The attack which Kierkegaard made on the Danish Church was fundamentally unfair, and the accusation which he made against it was really a disguised form of self-accusation, the self-accusation of a man who had not found peace with God. But

throughout everything he did see and preach the necessity of dogmatic Christianity, and, as Haecker says: " There is therefore all the more reason why theologians, for whom it remains true that Christianity without dogma and without authority is a chimera, should uncover the treasures which lie buried there (*i.e.*, in S. K.), courageously rejecting as dross what is not gold, and proclaiming as false and useless that which is neither tried nor true." In other words, it is the Catholic in Kierkegaard which needs to be disentangled. This is well illustrated by Haecker in a magnificent passage from S. K. on " God's goodness and omnipotence and its relation to evil," and it can be seen as well in his treatment of the suffering and sacrifice of Christ. To quote Haecker once and for all: " The real fruit of his faith is not found in his speculations on faith, where a false philosophy gives it a treacherous ground, but in those thoughts which sprang spontaneously from his real, personal and unreasoned faith, inspired by a passionate love of God, or which illuminated him like a flash of lightning." This work of sifting will, we hope, be done by a competent theologian, and presented in the form of extracts from his works.

But the necessity will still remain of having the whole of S. K.'s vast literary production accessible in translation, for his personality provides an inexhaustible source of interest and curiosity. No, it is a tremendous story which is unfolded, of an importance which, if not comparable with that of Augustine, yet reveals the tragic grandeur and the tragic misery of the human spirit. And this is precisely the importance of the present volume, the last of the six works which S. K. described as " æsthetic." For the contents of this volume are intimately related to his personal history. They are part of the story of his relations with Regine Olsen, the girl to whom he was for a time engaged, and they represent one stage of his efforts by the use of the " indirect method " both to justify his own behaviour to her (a strange thing to do in this public manner), and to convey to her (for she read his books) a message which he professed to think would " help her out of her position." The book is in effect a repetition of his earlier work, *Either—Or*, with the same apparatus of mystification, but, as so great a critic as Brandes assures us, with the same amazing qualities which mark off the literary achievement of Kierkegaard from that of other Danish writers. Of the *Banquet*, which is modelled on Plato's *Symposium*, Brandes says: " One must recognize with amazement that it holds its own in this comparison as well as any modern composition could." These subtle qualities of style cannot be transferred to any translation, however competent, and only occasional flashes suggest the stormy splendour of the original.

The next piece, *Observations about Marriage*, assigned to the happily-married "Judge William," is full of penetrating wisdom,

and in his profound and pungent criticism of Goethe, the Goethe who is so fully revealed in *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Kierkegaard shows up, more or less consciously, his own weakness in his love-relation with Regine, or rather in his attempts to justify his break with her, and, as Dr Lowrie puts it, to " spare himself " by poetizing the whole situation. " So then," S. K. says of Goethe, " whenever a life-relationship is about to overwhelm him he must remove it to a distance by poetizing it."

In his *Journal* S. K. pathetically and accurately put his finger on the spot. " If only I had had faith, I might have married her." There was really no more to say. But at the end of the *Observations* he tries to deal with his own case as an exception, just as in *Either—Or* he suggested that he might be " the exception in a good sense," and in *Fear and Trembling* had appealed to the supposed example of Abraham, in his readiness to sacrifice his son (" the teleological suspension of the ethical "), to justify his own " exceptional position." But in any case there is nothing but misery before him, unless God shall intervene at last, save him and give him peace. Meanwhile, he is the eternal penitent, who has the perpetual wretchedness of not knowing whether he is justified or no, whether he is guilty or not guilty.

This is the problem—*guilty or not guilty ?*—which he sets in the interminable pages of *Quidam's Diary*, and cannot in the last resort resolve. Indeed, he resolved none of his problems and professed to remain always a penitent. But do not let us forget that the man who wrote *Quidam's Diary* also wrote: " Now I must speak about my relationship to God; about that which is every day repeated in my prayer which gives thanks to Him for the indescribable things He has done for me, so infinitely much more than I had ever expected; about that which taught me to be amazed, to be amazed at God, at His love, and at what man's impotence is capable of performing with His aid." And *Quidam's Diary*, too, contains some wonderful things.

F. J. E. Raby.

Harpenden.

The Catholic Movement in the American Episcopal Church. By George E. De Mille. Church Historical Society, Philadelphia. $2.50.

In this attempt to give a concise account of the Catholic movement in the American Episcopal Church (the Anglican Communion, that is, in the United States) the author has drawn upon a wide variety of sources: the biographies of bishops and clergy, diocesan and parish histories, the journals of the General Convention, and other official documents. The result is a clear and straightforward account of a movement in the main parallel to our own Oxford Movement, and, indeed, in very large measure derivative from it. There were differences,

to be sure, chief among them being the fact that there was no Oxford to foster (or frustrate) these early gropings after beauty and colour and mystery in worship. Again, there was no Newman first to lead and then to abandon the movement, and yet to remain, even after the lapse of a century, its outstanding personality, the living embodiment of its very spirit. Finally, there was no establishment, hence no entanglement of Church and State further to complicate the already complicated warfare of persons and parties. The American Church during the greater part of its history has been independent of any outside control, its legal position being not essentially different from that of our own Nonconformist bodies, or the Church itself in those parts of the Empire where it is not established. With these and a few other minor differences, then, the trend of development in the American Church during the last hundred years or more has proceeded along lines familiar to us all.

The story opens at the end of the eighteenth century with what the writer aptly describes as " a Church in ruins "—" barely tolerated in some sections, and distrusted as half disloyal in all; despoiled of its endowments, with its churches in ruins and its clergy scattered; weakened within by clerical slackness and scarcely veiled Unitarianism; its teaching watery, its rites slovenly, its sacraments almost disused." In such a body, however, High Church teaching and in time High Church practices as well slowly developed. The pre-Tractarian period, lasting roughly down to the year 1840, is characterized by its emphasis upon such doctrines as the apostolic succession, the validity of the sacraments, the importance of the visible Church, etc.—doctrines, however, which remained little more than theories because there was no consistent attempt on the part of any one to relate them to the externals of worship. The appearance of the tracts and the influence they exerted tended to change this. " They gave the High Church party a clearer view of its own principles and of the logical conclusions of those principles; they inspired its younger adherents with new life and zeal; they broke up the old High Church complacency. . . . They gave to High Churchmanship a warmth, a colour, and intensity of devotion that had been sometimes—though not always—lacking in the more intellectual Catholicism of the older High Churchman. . . . The tracts showed the way to a Catholicism of worship and life."

The details of this struggle for a " Catholicism of worship and life " and the various stages by which it was finally achieved form the subject-matter of the later chapters of the book. Opposition to the movement naturally expressed itself in a variety of ways, none of them in the end successful. Controversies were conducted (mostly over matters long since generally taken for granted), now between bishops and clergy, now between clergy and laity, now between the two parties and

their representatives in the Diocesan and General Conventions. Toleration of practically everything that the earlier reformers stood for, and, indeed, of a good deal besides, has at length become fairly general, partly, no doubt, because men's minds are everywhere more tolerant (at least in matters ecclesiastical) than they were a hundred years ago, partly also because the structure and the traditions of the American Church make it impossible to enforce any sort of rigid uniformity. Such a position has naturally elements of strength and of weakness. Just as each diocese can give expression to its own type of churchmanship through its choice of bishop, so also can each parish to a very large extent secure the type of service it prefers through its choice of incumbent. Innovation and experiment, up to a point anyway, are thus rendered easy. The achievement of a Catholic ceremonial in this or that isolated parish must therefore be at some sacrifice of corporate unity and fellowship in the Church as a whole.

The book is to be commended for its careful assembling of materials not generally known or not readily available to any but a very restricted group of readers, and also for its prevailing tone of moderation and good sense. Most readers will, I feel sure, agree with the author's condemnation of what he calls " the lunatic fringe, the genuine Romanizers," those zealous but misguided persons " who are avowedly working for reunion with Rome, who were willing to accept all of Roman doctrine except papal infallibility, who despised manners and customs distinctively Anglican." A sane and central type of Anglicanism is, by implication at least, everywhere upheld, the future of which he identifies not so much with doctrinal or ceremonial developments as with social reform, roughly, so far as one can judge, along the lines indicated by the late Bishop Gore or the present Archbishop of Canterbury. " Thus we come," he says in conclusion, " to the fourth and final stage of the Catholic revival in the United States. We are entering, one hopes, upon the period when Catholic doctrine and Catholic devotion, nurtured within the Church, will find their true application in a whole-souled attempt to make over the United States of America into the Kingdom of God."

Benjamin Bissell.

Heath Vicarage,
Leighton Buzzard.

Then and Now: The Historic Church and the Younger Churches. By John Foster. S.C.M. Press. 6s.

One of the most notable developments of recent times is the rediscovery of the Church by many in whose denominational background it had little place. Some churchmen, however, are inclined to discount this new-found enthusiasm on the ground

that the Church, of which so much was said at, for instance, the Tambaram Conference, is something quite different from the one Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church of the Creed. " When they speak of the Church they do not mean the same thing as we do." But to what extent is this true? Mr Foster's new book is extremely interesting in many ways, but perhaps its chief importance is that it helps to answer this question. He is Professor of Church History in the Selly Oak Colleges. He is a Methodist, and in other Free Churches, too, there are some who share his views, or are likely to sympathize with them. Perhaps there are not many yet who go as far as he does, but his book is a notable sign of the progress of a movement which will lead to Christian reunion. What, then, does he say of the Church?

He believes profoundly that there is, and must be, a visible Church, and that it is a divine institution. " A transcendent Church ideal has no meaning unless it is related to that which persists among us." " A disembodied Christianity would never have persisted." " The whole meaning of the Church as His body is that it is in some sense His second Incarnation. He has no hands to do His will, no feet to walk His way, no voice to call men, apart from the *ecclesia*." It is indestructible, it is the City of God, of which Augustine wrote. In it Christ " is being out-and-out fulfilled."

The Church is one and the same from the Apostles' time until now. Our author rejoices that he belongs to it—" to all of it, and that all of it belongs to " him. " I can lay my claim to be heir to all the ages because of the faith *which has come down all the ages*, and which I hold or (should I say?) holds me." In various parts of the world the Church is now living under the same conditions, and facing the same problems, as the early Church did, and it is doing so in the same spirit. The early Church lives in the " younger Churches." The attacks on the Christian faith in the Far East, for instance, can be exactly paralleled in the early ages, and the writings of the Fathers show us how to answer them now.

Great stress is laid upon the importance of continuity and succession—chiefly with regard to doctrine, but in other matters too. " One of the chief tasks of the modern missionary is to embody and transmit the experience of the Universal Church." This applies, among other things, to creeds and liturgical worship. " The conflicts of the past . . . must not be allowed to rob us of the Book of Common Prayer as the link by which we *all* are joined on to the Church of the West in its pre-Reformation period." He does not quite get to the point of saying that continuity and succession are essential for the ministry, but it is difficult to suppose that he will long be able to avoid it. Of Church government he says: " I have known many monarchical *episcopoi*—Congregationalist, Baptist, Presbyterian and Methodist, as well as Anglican—ruling their Churches with

a firm and fatherly hand, as young Churches need and love to be ruled."

These extracts will serve to indicate Mr Foster's position. It is greatly to be desired that many will read his book.

G. W. Broomfield.

London.

Immortality. By Count H. Keyserling. Translated by Jane Marshall. Oxford University Press. 5s.

This is a new issue in the Oxford Bookshelf series of a work which Dr W. R. Inge has described as "Keyserling's remarkable work on immortality." It was written in 1906 when Keyserling was only twenty-five years of age. The theme is indicated on the title-page by a quotation from Spinoza: "Sentimus experimurque nos æternos esse." The approach is very different from that with which Christian theology is familiar. Keyserling deliberately refrains from any attempt to enquire "how, or why, or whence the thought of immortality could have arisen." What he tries to do is to ask what is the innermost content of the idea. He has little use for the argument *e consensu gentium*, and concludes that belief in immortality in our sense of the word is anything but a common possession of mankind, though there are hardly any people who would see death as an absolute end. But every sincere man feels himself a member of a higher synthesis. Death is the auxiliary of life, not the antithesis to it. Belief in immortality belongs to the ultimate underivative motives of mankind.

We must think of ourselves as dying from one moment to the next, while each stage represents the whole life. Death only brings to a close what is happening all the time. There is a permanent self and everything personal, all individuality—indeed, all consciousness—is on this side of it, linked with space and time. Keyserling agrees that personality was called to life by Christianity, and with it the idea of man as an end in himself. "In this respect the coming of Christ undoubtedly marks the most important turning point of the world's history, for it really entailed a transvaluation of all values" (p. 14). But he seems to over-identify Christian ideas of personality with individuality, ignoring the equally strong idea of personality-in-community which is in the Gospel. Chapter VI on man and mankind is fascinating, in view of Keyserling's study of the German and Japanese mentality, and is most useful in helping us to see the underlying issues of the present war, which is ultimately all about man and mankind in their relationships.

It seems at times as if Keyserling thinks of immortality only in an Eastern sense as the equation of Atman equals Brahman, but he argues that while it is true that the individual is only a transition stage in an eternal process moving to a mysterious

goal, yet the whole of that process is also present in some sense in the individual, and thus he has a value for it. But personal immortality or the " resurrection of the body " in the Christian sense is rejected, and the whole Christian emphasis on a personal God in relationship with personal sons through Christ is discounted. But it is a stimulating work, full of profound thought and scholarship, and the quality of the paper and print for the cost of the book is remarkable. Count Keyserling says on page 29 that " a really faithful translation is an impossibility." We cannot compare Miss Marshall's work with the original, but one is left with the impression that she has conveyed the thought of the German philosopher into English of such a quality that one never feels that it is a translation which is being read.

MARCUS KNIGHT.

NUNEATON.

A CHOICE OF KIPLING'S VERSE. Made by T. S. Eliot, with an essay on Rudyard Kipling. Faber. 8s. 6d.

I feel that I have a right to review *A Choice of Kipling's Verse*, made by T. S. Eliot, for surely I am the sort of reader for whom it was intended. I mean that before I saw this volume I had read next to nothing of Kipling's verse and wished to read none. Of what I had read I remembered only " Big Steamers," which I recited at the age of nine at a children's concert, and which (since it is fashionable for critics to mention omissions) is not included in Mr Eliot's selection. Actually, when I looked through the poems I found that I had read many more. Their titles had been forgotten, but the words were still familiar. This, at least, confirms Mr Eliot's contention in his introductory essay, that we do not easily forget Kipling.

The poems fall roughly into two categories: those in which he was satisfied to write verse, and those in which he tried, usually quite modestly, to write poetry. (There is no need now, nor do I pretend to have the ability, to revive the attempts to define " verse " and " poetry " which recently enlivened the correspondence of *The Times Literary Supplement*. In any case, any definition of " poetry " which excludes verse would not be satisfactory, yet there are many things in " poetry " which would not be comprehended in a definition of " verse.") Mr Eliot is concerned chiefly with Kipling's verse, pure and simple. The aim of the essay and of the selection is to show that Kipling was a great verse writer.

Turning to these poems, I find great gusto and immense technical virtuosity and even (in no derogatory sense) ingenuity. The skill in the handling of metres, and especially in the variations of difficult refrains, is not only admirable but captivating:

For it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' " Chuck him out, the brute !"
But it's " Saviour of 'is country " when the guns begin to shoot;
An' it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' anything you please;
An' Tommy ain't a bloomin' fool—you bet that Tommy sees !

The more peculiar metres, with their repeated stresses like drum-taps, perhaps cannot be appreciated thoroughly without a memory of the popular songs of forty years ago or more, but the virtuosity is still apparent:

For it was: " Belts, belts, belts, an' that's one for you !"
An' it was: " Belts, belts, belts, an' that's done for you !"
O buckle an' tongue
Was the song that we sung
From Harrison's down to the Park !

It is pleasing also to read in the beginning of " The Long Trail ":

There's a whisper down the field where the year has shot her yield,
And the ricks stand grey to the sun,

and to realize from this that even railway cats can enjoy Kipling.

But, except very occasionally, I cannot find any enjoyment in the " Barrack Room Ballads " and the others of that style. The dialect itself is a great obstacle. It looks ugly; the apostrophes stick up like branches in an untidy hedge; and the phonetic spelling, if pronounced faithfully, sounds like no known English language. There does not seem to me to be any real living person speaking, but only a grotesque caricature of the English soldier. Perhaps it is because I am too young to know the old music-halls. I can appreciate the style of jazz-song or the Odd Odes of Cyril Fletcher as used by Mr Auden and others (including Mr Eliot himself), but the eternal Billy Bennett who shouts through these poems cannot arouse my sympathy.

In the poems where he departs from dialect his rhetoric has a broadness of gesture which makes it far more moving than a mere versified argument, which is what, in the first place, it sets out to be. " The Bell Buoy " is a monologue in the form which is often used for the most trite children's recitations, yet there is true sonority behind its rather hollow words:

They christened my brother of old—
And a saintly name he bears—
They gave him his place to hold
At the head of the belfry-stairs,
Where the minster towers stand
And the breeding kestrels cry.
Would I change with my brother a league inland ?
(Shoal ! '*Ware shoal* !) Not I !

Even when Kipling sets out more deliberately to write poetry, his language is often the language of rhetoric rather than that

of incantation. " A Tree Song," which is pure lyric, sounds most of the time like argument:

> Of all the trees that grow so fair,
> Old England to adorn,
> Greater are none beneath the Sun
> Than Oak, and Ash, and Thorn.

You have only to compare that with a stanza from a poem by Mr de la Mare, very similar in content, to see how little Kipling relied on the magic of words and associations as distinct from the dexterity of his statement. Here are Mr de la Mare's lines (I quote from memory):

> Of all the trees in England,
> Her four sweet corners in,
> Only the ash, the bonny ash,
> Burns fierce while it is green.

Yet " A Tree Song " is undoubtedly a good poem, and does not seem any worse for comparison with Mr de la Mare's lovely little rhyme. Kipling, indeed, shared with Chesterton the gift of writing rhetoric which was also poetry—a gift very rare among poets below the first rank. The marshalling of his ideas was itself a work of creative imagination; it was not just the skeleton around which the poem was built, it *was* the poem.

It is to the poems on Sussex, those on English tradition and history, and the prophetic poems to which I turn with the greatest pleasure. There is no question here as to whether he was writing great verse or not; this, obviously, is poetry in the full sense of the term, though it is also minor poetry. I do not find it necessary to discuss Kipling's politics. For me, his imperialism no more increases nor interferes with the enjoyment of his verse than Addison's whiggery affects the enjoyment of " The Campaign." Yet it is a certain vision of England which gives these poems their power. Kipling was not primarily a descriptive poet. Such lines as:

> And now you would never know
> There was once a road through the woods
> Before they planted the trees,

have clarity which reminds you of Edward Thomas, but such passages are not common. More often he writes, as in " Sussex ":

> We have no waters to delight
> Our broad and brookless vales—
> Only the dewpond on the height
> Unfed, that never fails.

This is not visual writing, but the words " waters," " broad," " brookless " and " dewpond " are underlined, and it is left to the reader to fill in his own landscape. He draws a broad curve, as of a tune, using the important words as chords; yet

the broadness of the tune is not Handelian, but the broadness of certain hymn-tunes or of "Daisy Bell."

Mr Eliot, indeed, explains much about Kipling's verse when he says that he has the quality of a great hymn-writer. In the best hymns we find the same directness of language, the same imagery, not vague, but wide enough to have meaning to all the members of the congregation. Perhaps the best thing this volume did for me was to make me read "Cities and Thrones and Powers," "The Recall" and "Recessional," and find there poetry which I had never thought of looking for. It may be useful to read the familiar words out of their usual setting:

> Far-called, our navies melt away;
> On dune and headland sinks the fire:
> Lo, all our pomp of yesterday
> Is one with Nineveh and Tyre!
> Judge of the Nations, spare us yet,
> Lest we forget—lest we forget!

The first two lines, indeed, might have been written with "The Prince of Wales" and Dunkirk in mind.

For directing my attention to these poems—only a third or less of the volume—I have reason to be grateful to Mr Eliot. The book, too, evidently has sold well and therefore is justified in the publishers' eyes. Yet I wonder if Mr Eliot could not have published his essay without supporting it with 300 pages of selected poems. Kipling's verse is not inaccessible, and the present volume is neither cheap nor handy in size. A procession of young unpublished poets counts the pages sadly, and marches round Russell Square.

NORMAN NICHOLSON.

MILLOM.

TOWARDS A THEOCRACY. By John Kennedy. Hodder and Stoughton. 6s.

The indebtedness of European society to the social conscience of Protestantism would be a valuable subject for research. In England alone the debt must be considerable (though one does not forget the effects of *laisser-faire*) and one notices with gratitude Dr Temple's judicious remarks on this subject in his recent Penguin, *Christianity and Social Order*, a tract that is being avidly studied, I can testify, by young men both in the Forces and in industry.

It would be salutary if all Anglican sociologists were as well informed as Dr Temple: it might spare us some of those dramatic generalizations about post-reformation history which are as silly as they are daunting.

Dr Kennedy is a Presbyterian, but the introduction to his book is by the Bishop of Manchester—a wholesome and encouraging conjunction of churchmanship. Nevertheless, I hope this book

will be read by non-Christians as well as Christians, for the former may be glad to learn the realism that exists within the Church and the latter will certainly be stimulated by Dr Kennedy's vigorous mind. His style I should describe as—and I use the phrase in its most honourable sense—effective journalism. We welcome it. He sees and describes with a sure touch the astonishing complex of organizations, avocations and frustrations which is modern society. But having given us a thoroughgoing analysis of contemporary society, he does not throw up his hands in despair; he does not unduly sentimentalize over the Middle Ages; and he realizes, though not I think fully, the benefits of technology. But this, of course, is the gaping abyss dividing older sociologists from those of us in our early thirties; we believe that power from machines is potentially beneficent—even the present horror has not shaken that faith. Put it this way: the older generation begin from Aquinas—and find us unrepentantly ill-read; we start from Ohm's law—and find them much the same, if I dare say so. But lucky it is for the preservation of democracy that we do, there being a war on. Still, a synthesis is necessary and inevitable: we need both traditional wisdom and current knowledge.

Dr Kennedy is sufficiently mature a thinker to be very humble and his sketches of a future society are purposively tentative. I wish he had said more about education, however, and discussed the possibilities of adult education—the kind of work done by the Cambridgeshire Village Colleges, the Residential Settlements, and so on. Perhaps he will do so in the near future; he will find at least one appreciative reader.

JOHN SHORT.

LETCHWORTH.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.)

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS: W. C. Dampier, *A History of Science* (25s.)
JAMES CLARKE: C. J. Wright, *The Eternal Kingdom* (5s.); H. H. Rowley, *The Relevance of the Bible* (6s.).
FABER: K. E. Barlow, *The Discipline of Peace* (8s. 6d.).
FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION: L. Maclachlan, *The Faith of Friendship* (2s. 6d.).
GOLLANCZ: Victor Gollancz, *Shall our Children Live or Die?* (2s. 6d.).
LONGMANS: J. Hadham, *Between God and Man* (3s. 6d.); E. Underhill, *The Fruits of the Spirit* (3s. 6d.).
MOWBRAYS: J. M. Swift, *Jehovah's Witnesses* (4d.); R. Lumb, *The First Three Years* (1s. 6d.).
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS: S. Kierkegaard, *Unscientific Postscript* (36s.).
PAX HOUSE: *If any Man Serve Me*—Broadcast Readings for Holy Week (2s.); R. L. Hodson, *The Praying Christ* (6d.); J. H. L. Morrell, *Four Words* (6d.).
S.C.M. PRESS: A. E. Baker (Ed.), *A Christian Basis for the Post-War World* (2s. 6d.); H. Kosmala and R. Smith, *The Jew in the Christian World* (6s.).
S.P.C.K.: S. Bolshakoff, *The Christian Church and the Soviet Union* (3s. 6d.).
STIRLING TRACT ENTERPRISE: R. Fairway, *The Fellowship of Fire* (6d.).
WILLIAMS AND NORGATE: C. C. Salway, *Refugees and Industry* (1s.).

INDEX TO VOLUME XLIV

JANUARY TO JUNE, 1942

PAGE

Absentee Landlords 238
Analogy, Aquinas and Bishop Berkeley 321
Archiepiscopal Manners 291
Armistice, Thoughts on an 1

BAILEY, S. 202, 275

BOOKS REVIEWED:

Addleshaw, *The High Church Tradition* (E. G. Selwyn) . . . 182
An Introduction to Christian Social Doctrine (R. H. Preston) . . 120
Bennett, *Christian Realism* (A. R. Vidler) 121
Bishop, *Christ and "the Spirit"* (A. Richardson) 113
Bishop G. L. King: the Man and his Message (L. D. Heppenstall) . 119
Bodkin, *The Quest of Salvation* (S. L. Bethell) 116
Cadoux, *The Historic Mission of Jesus* (G. O. Williams) . . . 307
Carlyle, *Political Liberty* (F. J. E. Raby) 188
Corkey, *War, Pacifism and Peace* (M. A. C. Warren) . . . 63
De Mille, *The Catholic Movement in the American Episcopal Church* (B. Bissell) 372
Duguid, *I am Persuaded* (C. D. Waddams) 252
Eliot (Ed.), *A Choice of Kipling's Verse* (N. Nicholson) . . . 377
Fellowes, *English Cathedral Music* (O. R. Clarke) 125
Foster, *Then and Now* (G. W. Broomfield) 374
Frost, *In His Image* (H. Balmforth) 186
Hartill (Ed.), *Into the Way of Peace* (E. L. Mascall) . . . 115
Hebert, *The Throne of David* (C. W. Dugmore) 110
Huxley, *Grey Eminence* (B. Wormald) 367
Keyserling, *Immortality* (M. Knight) 376
Kierkegaard, *Stages on Life's Way* (F. J. E. Raby) 370
Kissane, *The Book of Isaiah* (C. Witton-Davies) 248
Lewis, *The Screwtape Letters* (C. S. Gillett) 306
Macgregor, *The Relevance of the Impossible* (M. A. C. Warren) . . 63
Malvern, 1941 (K. E. Barlow) 243
Martin, *A Plain Man's Life of Christ* (J. D. M. Stuart) . . . 185
Murry, *Cinnamon and Angelica* (S. L. Bethell) 116
Peck, *Return to Holiness* (G. Shaw) 122
Rattenbury, *Charles Wesley's Hymns* (C. S. Phillips) . . . 112
Reckitt and Casserley, *The Vocation of England* (G. Every) . . 310
Reeves and Drewett, *What is Christian Education?* (W. S. Evans) . 312
Richards, *Housman*, 1897-1936 (M. Jarrett-Kerr) 190
Rupp, *Is this a Christian Country?* (H. K. Archdall) . . . 246
Spiritualism and Psychic Research (M. Knight) 123
Strachan, *The Fourth Gospel* (R. V. G. Tasker) 250
Synge, *St Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians* (A. M. Farrer) . . . 62
Taylor, *Forgiveness and Reconciliation* (A Member of C.S.M.V.) . 187
The Church Looks Ahead (W. James) 117

BRADBROOK, M. C. 13, 81
BRADE, W. R. V. 291
BROWN, W. J. 51
BURDESS, M. 144

CHARLESWORTH, M. P. 167
Church and Youth, The 211

PAGE

Church History Survey 170
Clergy and Laity—a Reply 74
Cockin, F. A. 74
Collins, L. J. 44
Comment on Literary Periodicals 107
Continuity of Pentecost, The 303
Correspondence 54, 179, 240, 300, 354

Day, E. H. 341
Dean Stanley and the Christian Year 232
Demant, V. A. 267
Derby, Bishop of 24, 90
Divine Providence, On 193
Double Standard in Christian Ethics, The 144

Every, G., S.S.M. 107, 351

Film Version of Shaw's "Major Barbara" 282

God and History 24
Great Church, The 31
Guardini, Romano 335

History and Eschatology 90
Hudson, E. C. 104
Hughson, S. C. 100

Importance of Niebuhr, The 267

Lampert, E. 193
Le Messurier, R. H. 234
Lichfield, Dean of 262
Liturgical Tradition in English Verse 13, 81
Love and Marriage 202, 275
Lumb, J. R. 174

March, W. W. S. 321
Marinoff, I. 335
Moorman, J. R. H. 347
Moral Influence of Literature, The 154

Natural Law, Inquiries Concerning 65
New Verse 351
Newby, C. R. 162
Nicæa, The City of the Creed 104

Old Archbishop and the New, The 262
Ordinations under the Commonwealth 341

Philosophy and Theology 133
Prior, A. N. 329

Reader's Guide to Barth's Dogmatics 329
Religious Education (Survey of Books) 51
Religious Education and the G.O.E. 174
Revised Reviews 44, 100, 167, 228, 291, 347

S.A.C. 211
Sampson, A. 154
Sell that thou hast 234

PAGE

SHAW, G. 31
Shorter Notices 127, 181, 242, 253, 313, 380
SMITH, R. G. 220
SMYTH, C. 1
Studies in Texts 48, 296
SYKES, N. 170
SYNGE, F. C. 228

THOMPSON, R. C. 282
TILLICH, P. 133

VIDLER, A. R. 65

WILLIAMSON, H. R. 303
WINDSOR, DEAN OF 232
" *Women which Labour in the Gospel* " 162
Words 220
WRIGHT, R. F. 296

YATES, J. E. 48

Printed in Great Britain by
Billing and Sons Ltd., Guildford and Esher